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MINERAL OWNERSHIP THEORY: DOCTRINE IN DISARRAY0
RONALD W. POLSTON**
I. INTRODUCTION TO MINERAL OWNERSHIP THEORY:
THE CORPOREAL/INCORPOREAL CLASSIFICATION
The theory upon which mineral ownership is based was created to
serve the coal industry as it developed early last century and was subse-
quently modified to serve the oil industry. Its purpose was to give the
coal industry, and later the oil industry, a more substantial ownership
interest in the land, with respect to developmental rights, than the indus-
tries would have received under the existing and developing legal institu-
tions at the time the first coal cases were decided. The legal system, at
the time the theory was developed, characterized the fee simple interest
in land as corporeal, and the servitudes as incorporeal.1 It seemed fairly
clear that the interest in the coal, whether acquired by a deed of the coal
itself, or by the exclusive right to mine it,2 would have been classified as
incorporeal under that system. The courts rejected that approach, how-
ever, and labeled the interest in the coal as corporeal. Furthermore, the
courts conceived of that corporeal interest as a tract of land which lay
beneath the surface and included everything except a thin layer of soil,
which was of sufficient depth to permit the residual owner, who they
labeled the "surface owner," to cultivate or build upon.
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CLASSIFICATION
The corporeal/incorporeal dichotomy, which the courts used as a
basis for the coal ownership theory, can only be understood in relation to
the concept of seisin. Seisin is a concept which regards the ownership of
land as a physical thing. To transfer ownership, the thing was symbolically
picked up and handed to the grantee. A lesser interest than the total
* Portions of this article were prepared for the forthcoming publication, DAVID A. THOMAS,
THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY (1994), and are reprinted with special permission from the Michie
Company, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1-800-542-0957. All Rights Reserved.
.. Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis; B.S., Eastern Illinois
University; L.L.B., University of Illinois College of Law.
1. The terms "corporeal" and "incorporeal" are sometimes said to be the equivalent of
ossessory and nonpossessory, but both dichotomies are relies of a prior era and neither accurately
describes the qualities which are supposed to distinguish easements and similar interests from the
more substantial interests with which they are being contrasted. For further discussion of the
definitional problem, see infra part I.B. and accompanying text.
2. In Cidwell v. Fulton, 31 Pa. 475,481 (Pa. 1858) [hereinafter Caldwell I], the conveyance was
of the right to mine coal, rather than a conveyance of the coal itself, and the court held that there was
no difference between the two. The court went on to hold that the conveyance amounted to a
transfer of the coal in place, and characterized the interest as corporeal. I& While the decision
finding no difference between the two kinds of conveyances is probably sound, the result drawn from
that conclusion will be challenged in this article.
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could not be handled in the same manner and yet there were many kinds
of interests which were carved out of, or became associated with, the
ownership of land. They were called incorporeal and they could only be
transferred or created by grant.3 They were regarded as nonpossessory,
or intangible, in relation to the land, but they were also regarded, in their
own right, as "things" and the owners of these things were said to be
"seised" of them.a The concept was a strange mixture of the physical and
the abstract.5
The kinds of interests which were classified as incorporeal included
many that would not be recognized as interests in land today, but were so
classified at that time in order to give them some legal status in a system
which did not have a well developed body of contract law into which they
could be fitted.6 Incorporeal interests included offices, annuities, tithes,
rents, and many other such interests.' There were also some customary
rights similar to present day easements and profits, which grew out of the
strip cultivation system of the Middle Ages,8 which would not be a part of
our law today. However, included in that system were the interests which
became the easements and profits of today9 and, although they were not
clearly defined until around the nineteenth century,' 0 they existed in that
system in a form that is recognizable today.
There were rights of way which would be recognized as easements
today, as well as rights called commons," or several rights,"2 which enti-
3. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIE S ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 317
(facsimile ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1979) ("[A]ll corporeal hereditaments, as lands and houses, are
said to lie in livery; and the others, as advowsons, commons, rents, reversions, &c, to lie in grant.").
See also WILuAM HoLDsvoRTn, III HOLDSWORTI, A Hisronv OF TIE LAw OF ENGLAND 99 (3d. ed.
Little Brown 1927) "But though it had thus been finally settled that these incorporeal things could be
transferred or created by dee-d, and that they did not lie in livery, many of the consequences of the
medieval law remained." Id.
4. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 3, at 99. ("The remedies provided for the enforcement and
protection of all these incorporeal rights makes it very clear that they are regarded as things to which
the doctrines of seisin can be applied."). FREDERICK POLLOCK 8& FREDERUCK MAITLAND, II
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTOaY OF ENGLISH LAW, 124 (2nd. ed. Cambridge U.P. 1968) "This
is no fiction invented by speculative jurists. For the popular mind these things are things. The
lawyer's business is not to make them things but to point out that they are incorporeal.Id
5. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3. at 20 (describing the existence of these "things" as: "merely in
idea and abstracted contemplation; though their effects and profits may be frequently objects of our
bodily senses").
6. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 4, at 146 ("The yet feeble law of contract is supplemented
by a generous liberality in the creation of incorporeal things.").
7. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at 21 ("Incorporeal hereditaments are principally of ten sorts;
advowsons, tithes, commons, ways, offices, dignities, franchises, corodies or pensions, annuities, and
rents.").
8. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 3, at 145.
9. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at 32-35 (describing the incorporeal rights known as
commons and ways).
10. See Alfred E. Conard, Easements, Licenses and the Statute of Frauds, 15 TEMP. L.Q. 222,
223 (1940-1941).
11. See HOLDSWORTII, supra note 3, at 145.




tled the owner to take the profits of land in which such an owner had no
possessory interest. The right to take the profit was described by the
Latin term "profit a prendre in alieno solo.' 3 In the American common
law, these rights came to be called, simply, profits i prendre.14 These
latter rights, when known as commons or several rights, were said to
include the right to take some substance from the land. Such interests
might be appurtenant or appendant, but, unlike easements, they could
also be held in gross.' 5 The principal kinds of commons were pasture,
turbay, piscary, and estovers. 16 Pasture was said to be the right to take
the grass from the land by the mouths of the cattle. 7 Turbary was the
right to take turf, piscary the right to take fish, and estovers the right to
take wood.' 8 There are other rights sometimes included in the list, such
as the right to take coals.'
These rights were called commons and were usually regarded as
nonexclusive rights. They were generally held in common with the pos-
sessory owner and, perhaps, with other nonpossessory owners, but they
could be exclusive and were then called several rights.2 0 They were all
clearly classified as incorporeal, however.2'
B. CURRENT USE OF THE CLASSIFICATION
One factor which probably contributed to the classification error into
which the courts were led was that the corporeal/incorporeal classification
system was at that time becoming meaningless. The concept of seisin was
becoming obsolete and transfers by livery of seisin were rarely, if ever,
used.2 Furthermore, the incorporeal interests which were included in
13. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 3, at 143 ('There are many varieties of right to profits a prendre
in alieno solo known to the common law, and most of them may be the subjects of common rights.").
14. Witt L. BURDICK, HANDBOOK OF TnE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 441 (West 1914);
TIFFANY, supra note 12., at 427.
15. See BLACKSONE, supra note 3, at 34.
Commons in gross, or at large, is such as is neither appendant nor appurtenant to land,
but is annexed to a man's person; being granted to him and his heirs by deed .... is a
separate inheritance, entirely distinct from any landed property, and maybe vested in one
who has not a foot of ground in the manor.
rL
16. IdL at 34-35 (discussing the different kinds of commons and the rights associated with each).
17. POLOCK & MArrLAND, supra note 4, at 146.
18. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at 34-35.
19. Id. at 35.
20. TIFFANY, supra note 12, at 435.
21. 2WSee BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at 32. "Common, or right of common, appears from [its]
very definition to be an incorporeal hereditament." Id "There is also a common of digging for coals,
minerals, stones, and the like. All these bear a resemblance to common of pasture in many respects;
though In one point they go much farther common of pasture being only a right of feeding on the
herbage and vesture of the soil, which renews annually; but common of turbary and the rest, are a
right of carrying away the very soil itself." Id.
22. Caldwell 1, 31 Pa. 475, 480 (Pa. 1858) (noting that the earlier lav had classified interests as
incorporeal because they were not susceptible to transfer by livery of seisin, but saying: "[w]ith us
delivery and registration of the deed stand in lieu of livery").
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that classification system, as it was later to develop, were only then being
clearly defined.23 The terms "corporeal" and "incorporeal," which were
based upon that obsolete system of thought, are occasionally used today,
but it is generally recognized that these terms do not accurately describe
the qualities which distinguish the servitudes from the more substantial
interests out of which they are carved. Nor do the terms "possessory/
nonpossessory" or "tangible/intangible," which are substantial equivalents,
provide any better understanding of the concept. All interests in land are
regarded as intangible 4 and the servitudes clearly involve a right of access
to land which cannot be distinguished from the possessory rights of a fee
owner.' While the possessory/nonpossessory dichotomy is used today, it
is recognized that the distinction being made is between the principal
possessory right and a lesser possessory right.2 6 Even when so used, how-
ever, it still falls short of describing the real difference, which is one
between the general possessory, or residual, interest and the right of
access for a limited purpose. As long as these terms are so defined, there
would seem to be no problem with continuing to use them.
II. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH: THE OWNERSHIP IN
PLACE THEORY
A. COMMON LAw DEVELOPMENT
The terms corporeal and incorporeal were in the process of evolving
from their medieval meaning into their modem meaning when the first
23. See THOMAS, supra note *, at 64.01(c); Conard, supra note 10, at 224.
24. HOWARD R. WItUiAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAv § 211 at 130.1 (1992).
Hohfeld points out that all legal interests are incorporeal in character; Kocurek, taldng
the same position, points out that the right of ownership is no more corporeal than is a
right to an easement; Salmond observes that the distinction sought to be made between
corporeal and incorporeal property, if literally applied, is illogical and absurd.
Id.
25. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 437 (2d ed. 1993).
Thus, 'incorporeal' means simply 'non-possessory." Today, however, the word carries
inaccurate connotations that easements and profits are non-physical interests, contrasted
with physical estates. In the first place, all interests in land are non-physical concepts.
legally protected rights. Second, the uses that may be exercised by the holder of a
servitude are as physical as the possession that goes with an estate[.]
Id
26. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450, cmt. c (1944). "The slight degree of control which the
owner of easements have as compared with the degree of control which possessors of land have has
led to the classification of easements as incorporeal interests, while possessory interests are classed as
corporeal interests." Id. See also CHARLES EDWARD CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING
WITH THE LAND 90 (2d ed. Callaghan 1947).
A final question arises as to how easements may be distinguished from other interests
freely assignable. The question ... often arises in connection with leases or profits in
mineral and oil lands. The distinguishing feature in each case seems to be whether
possession is granted or not ... . Historially it would seem clear that the seisin of the
servient estate would not pass in such situation. This appears to be as satisfactory an
answer as is possible, since the line must be drawn somewhere.
544 [Vol. 70:541
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cases involving coal ownership theory were decided. It is not surprising,
therefore, that those early coal cases would mix the concepts and labels of
the old and new in attempting to apply the rules27 to an emerging indus-
try which did not seem to fit into that system. The end result was that the
courts classified the coal interest as corporeal even though it did not meet
the test for being included in that category by either the old or new
system.
The coal ownership could not have been classified as corporeal
under the old system because the test, under that system, was whether
the interest could be transferred by livery of seisin. Since livery of seisin
was no longer being used, however, that test did not seem to present any
obstacle. Under the new system, the test was whether the interest was a
general possessory or residual interest in the land, on the one hand, or a
right of access for a limited purpose, on the other. Obviously, the coal
interest could not satisfy that test because the coal owner had only a right
of access for the purpose of removing the coal.
This new definition of corporeal had probably not yet been articu-
lated, and therefore would not have been a basis at that time for objecting
to labeling the coal interest as corporeal. The very idea of calling an inter-
est in land "corporeal" or "possessory" when the interest consisted of the
right to remove a substance which was out of sight, and the existence of
which was as uncertain, as the coal was prior to the opening of a mine,
seemed to present a similar limitation. At any rate, the objection was
overcome by the device of considering the coal as being "owned in
place." 9 It was argued that since the coal was owned in place and since it
occupied space within the area encompassed by the ad coelum concept,30
the coal owner had a general possessory right that could be called
corporeal. 31
The problem with such reasoning, of course, is that it posits a rela-
tionship with respect to the coal and then, without articulation, expands
that relationship to include the land in which the coal is located. 2 Even if
27. Caldwell 1, 31 Pa. 475,475 (Pa. 1858) (remaining consistent with existing authority by calling
the interest in the coal incorporeal, but "at loss whether to denominate the grant of coal in Caidwell's
deed to Greer a common in gross, or appurtenant, or a license[ ]").
28. Caldwell v. Copeland, 37 Pa. 427,431 (1860) (involving the same parties and same tract as in
Caldwell 1, 31 Pa. 475 (Pa. 1858)) [hereinafter CaIdwell II]. "The law of livery has never embarrassed
our conveyancing in Pennsylvania. In other words, mines are land, and subject to the same laws of
possession and conveyance." Id.
29. Caldwel 1, 31 Pa. at 479 ("An exclusive right to all the coal.., is a sale of the coal itself; and
there is nothing incorporeal about coal.")
30. At common [aw, ownership of land, as described by the Latin phrase ad coelum usque ad
infernos was said to extend from the center of the earth to the heavens. See CUNNINCHAM, supra
note 25, at 27.
31. CaIdwell 11, 37 Pa. at 431.
32. The Caldwell II court was confusing the profit produced by the right with the right itself,
something Blackstone had cautioned against when he said:
1994] 545
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a coal deed conveys the coal, and even if that is considered to give title to
the coal in place, the right in the land is still nothing more than the right
to have access for the purpose of removing the coal. Indeed, the profit a
prendre always gave precisely the same right. It gave the right, which
could be exclusive, to remove the intended substance and realize
whatever economic benefit that entailed. Theorizing that the substance is
owned in place prior to removal adds nothing to the rights of the owner of
the profit insofar as the economic benefits to be realized from such own-
ership are concerned. Nor should it cause the courts to consider the right
any more substantial than would have been true had it been properly
classified as an incorporeal interest.
Nevertheless, the logic of the proposition that since coal was owned
in place, the owner's interest should be classified as corporeal, was
adopted by the courts and accepted by the text writers.3 Perhaps the
only exception is reflected in the Louisana Mineral Code.34 The Official
Comments to the provision in the Louisana Code,-" which rejects the
ownership in place approach, provide an interesting commentary on this
issue.
In the early oil and gas cases in Louisiana, minerals were classified as
incorporeal. The Louisana Code, which incorporates a doctrine called
"liberative prescription," was applied to them.36 Under that doctrine,
interests in such minerals were terminated after ten years of nonuse.37
The cases indicated that the same incorporeal classification, and, there-
fore, the Code provisions, would be applied to solid minerals; however,
there was no clear law on the subject until the adoption of the Mineral
And indeed if we would fix a clear notion of an incorporeal hereditament, we must be
careful not to confound together the profits produced, and the thing, or hereditament
which produces them. An annuity for instance, is an incorporeal hereditament; for
though the money, which is the fruit or product of this annuity, is doubtless of a corporeal
nature, yet the annuity itself, which produces that money, is a thing invisible[.]
BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at 20.
33. See, c.g., CARL ZOLLMAN, TIFFANY ON REAL PROPERTY 577 (Abridged ed. 1940) ('Such a
right [a profit a prendre] must be distinguished from an estate in a portion of the soil containing the
minerals, which may be separated, for purposes of ownership, from the surface of the ground."). The
Restatement of Property takes a narrower, but consistent position, indicating that an estate can be
created in the minerals if a distinct vein of coal is transferred. It recognizes "a conveyance which, in
terms conveys a physical substance, as a conveyance of coal in place." RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY
§ 471, cmt. C (1944). The Restatement position is as objectionable as that of Tiffany because it does
not take into account that the interest disappears when the coal is mined out and that the right is,
therefore, nothing but the limited right to remove the coal.
34. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:28-31:61 (West 1989).
35. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31 § 5 (West 1989).
36. See Frost-Johnson Laboratory Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 91 So. 207 (1920) (classifying mineral
interests as incorporeal); see also Ronald W. Polston, Legislation Existing and Proposed Concerning
Marketability of Mineral 7it/es, 7 LAND & WATER L REv. 73, 82 n.29 (1972) (discussing the
application of the doctrine of liberative prescription to solid minerals) [hereinafter Polton,
Marketability of Mineral Titles].
37. See infra notes 148-150 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 70:541546
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Code of 1975.1 Section 5 of the Mineral Code expressly includes solid
minerals within the operation of the liberative prescription doctrine by
providing that they "are insusceptible of ownership apart from the land
until reduced to possession."39 Comments following Section 5 argue that
this provision does not address the extent to which such minerals can be
owned in place, and that under Section 490 of the Civil Code, they are
owned in place.4° Section 490 simply states the common law ad coelum
doctrine.4" The position seems to be that if the minerals are owned in
place under the ad coelum approach, they must be owned in place for
purposes of the corporeal/incorporeal classification. From this, the com-
mentator argues that while they are owned in place under section 490 of
the Civil Code, section 5 of the Mineral Code simply reflects a policy of
prohibiting their transfer apart from the surface.42
In fact, the comments argue that the cases in Louisana could be said
to have taken the same position with respect to oil and gas and that
in the abstract such a theory has advantages in terms of concep-
tual symmetry. Nevertheless, the better interpretation of the
jurisprudence is that the servitude theory is still applied to liq-
uid and gaseous minerals on the assumption, however[ ] mis-
taken, that they are insusceptible of ownership in place and to
solid minerals for reasons of policy without regard to their sus-
ceptibility to ownership because of their physical nature.4
The comments in the Louisiana Code" contain an assumption which
is open to challenge: That conclusions about the rights of a landowner to
the minerals prior to, or in the absence of, a severance of the minerals
require a particular result in disputes between a severed mineral owner
and the residual owner. Thus, if the minerals are said to be owned in
place by the fee owner prior to severance, they must also be said to be
owned in place, and therefore corporeal, after severance.
Actually, the ownership in place concept plays little or no role in
disputes concerning the minerals prior to severance. With respect to oil
and gas, that approach has been rendered meaningless by the rule of cap-
ture, which holds that the ownership is lost if those substances migrate
across boundary lines.4 While some disputes between unsevered land-
owners over ownership of the oil and gas have supposedly been resolved
38. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 31.28-:61 (West 1988).
39. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:5 (West 1988).
40. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31 § 5 cmt. (West 1988).
41. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 25, at 27.
42. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31 § 5 cmt. (,Vest 1988).
43. id
44. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31 § 5 (West 1988).
45. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
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in a particular way because of this theory, in fact, the very same result is
reached in jurisdictions which do not regard the substances as owned in
place.46 With respect to solid minerals, there can never be any dispute
between unsevered owners with respect to ownership in place, because
any removal of the minerals of another would be a trespass and the own-
ership in place concept would play no role in resolving the dispute. The
ownership in place theory does not, therefore, play any significant role in
relation to unsevered minerals, and whatever role it does play has no rele-
vance to the kinds of questions which are raised with respect to severed
minerals. The Louisana commentator, who sees abstract conceptual sym-
* metry in such a system, is far from being abstract and finds symmetry in
unlike things. Despite the comments, the Louisana Code is a fairly clear,
and perhaps the only, repudiation of the ownership in place theory with
respect to solid minerals.
1. Coal Cases
Having labeled the coal owner's right as corporeal, or possessory, the
courts had to describe the interest in a way that would give it more resem-
blance to a fee simple, or general possessory interest in a tract of land
than if it were regarded as nothing more than the right to remove
whatever coal might be found under the land. The courts thus proceeded
to describe the coal interest as though it were a buried tract of land, and
the interest included everything just beneath the surface. One court, for
example, referred to a conveyance reserving the minerals as a situation in
which the grantor "severs his estate vertically, i.e. he grants out his estate
in parallel horizontal layers, and the grantee gets only the parallel layer
granted to him .... .47 Similarly, a Pennsylvania court stated: "[A] mine
right severed from the ownership of the soil, may be regarded as a sepa-
rate close, and compared to the lower story of a building."'
It was also necessary to recharacterize the common law profit a pren-
dre to remove it as far as possible from the interest being described. A
Pennsylvania court, in one of the first coal theory cases, did this by saying
that the "common of estovers, of turbary, and of coals, are not, strictly
speaking, incorporeal, for they are not so much the produce of the lands
annually renewable as they are part of the land itself. But these are
46. See WILLIAMS & Mmvs, supra note 24, at 204.5.
47. Eardley v. Granville, 3 Ch. D. 826, 834 (1876). See also Caldwell 1, 31 Pa. 475, 481 (1858)
("[lit is more incongruous still to treat the surface as a corporeal hereditament, and the mine right...
as incorporeal....It would be more according to analogy to consider the surface as incorporeal[.1");
Lilibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co., 22 A. 1035, 1037 (Pa. 1891) ("[T]here would be no more
propriety in claiming a title in the grantor [who conveyed the coal] to the space [the coal] occupies
than there would be in claiming a similar right in a vendor of the surface to the space developed by
the vendee in digging the cellar and foundation of a house.").
48. Scranton v. Phillips, 94 Pa. 15, 21 (Pa. 1880).
[Vol. 70:541
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always appendant or appurtenant .... ..49 That statement, of course, is
incorrect with respect to both of the points made, because the commons,
including those mentioned by the court, were clearly considered to be
incorporeal5 ° and were permitted to be held in gross in the English com-
mon law.51
Furthermore, the characterization of the coal interest as a possessory
or residual interest in a buried tract of land is not consistent with reality.
The coal interest is, as indicated, a right to only such coal as may be pres-
ent, and if there is none, or if it is mined out,52 the interest ceases to
confer a right of access to the land. While an early Pennsylvania case
indicated that the space occupied by the coal is owned by the coal owner,
thereby suggesting that the coal owner has more than merely a right to
remove the coal, subsequent decisions have been to the contrary.-3
The first Pennsylvania case to consider the question of ownership of
mined-out space was Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co., 4 in which the
residual owner sought to prevent the coal owner from using the mined-
out space for transporting coal which had been mined from beneath other
lands.55 The residual owner argued that the situation was similar to cases
in which a mineral owner was not permitted to use the surface of the land
to transport coal mined from other lands.5" Those cases reasoned that
while the coal owner has an implied easement to use the surface to obtain
access to the coal mined from beneath the servient tract, it would go
beyond the scope of the easement to serve nondominant property.5 7 In
applying the rule prohibiting the use of the easement to serve nondomi-
nant property, the Lillibridge court could see no difference between
using the surface and using the mined-out tunnels.58 As a result, the
49. Caldwell I, 31 Pa. at 479.
50. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at 32, 34.
51. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at 34.
52. The Virginia Dormant Minerals Statute operates on the theory that when there has been no
mining activity for a period of 35 years, there is a conclusive presumption that there are no minerals
under the land. The operative section of the statute provides: [Ilt shall be presumed that there are
no commercial miners.. in or on the land, and the court shall enter a decree declaring the claim
or right to be a cloud on the title and releasing the land therefrom ... ." VA. COD E ANN. § 55-155
(Michie 1986).
53. Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co., 22 A. 1035, 1037 (Pa. 1891); but see infra note 63-64
and accompanying text.
54. 22 A. 1035 (Pa. 1891).
55. Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co., 22 A. 1035, 1036 (Pa. 1891).
56. ld The entire opinion is devoted to the question of the ownership of space and the court
does not even cite or discuss the authorities which are being repudiated. It is clear from the
statement of the plaintiff's position and from the authorities quoted, however, that this is the
contention being made. See id. "There is no doubt that the Duke of Hamilton was not entitled to
increase the burdens upon the servitude on the surface by bringing minerals from other property over
the surface." Id at 1038 (quoting Hamilton v. Graham, L. R. 2 H. L. at 166 (1871)).
57. Supra note 56.
58. Lillibridge, 22 A. at 1036.
But it is contended with great earnestness.., that nothing more than the coal passed to
the defendant... and, as to the chamber or space left by the removal of the coal ... the
1994]
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court felt that if the coal owner was to have a right to use the mined-out
tunnels, it must base that right on something other than easement. 9 It
therefore held that right to be based upon ownership of the space left by
mining out the coal.60 While the Lillibridge opinion contains some equiv-
ocal language, it seemed to be saying that the space occupied by the coal
was owned in fee by the coal owner.61 Indeed, the court expressly recog-
nized that any other holding would require that the interest be classified
as incorporeal. 62 However, subsequent cases in Pennsylvania and else-
where have held that the right to use the space exists only until the coal
mining operation is completed. The Lillibridge opinion is now cited in
support of the position that until the mining operation is completed, the
coal owner has the exclusive right to use the tunnels.' A recent New
York case applied this rule to a salt mine operation and held that the
surface owner could not lease the mined-out tunnels as long as the salt
owner was using the space for conducting a mining operation, even if the
major part of the operation was on other lands.64 That decision also rec-
ognized that when the salt mining operation was completed, the space
would belong to the residual fee owner.6
The results in the cases involving use of mined-out space do not
depend upon the classification of the interest as corporeal. In fact, to the
extent that they recognize the ultimate ownership of that space by the
residual fee owner, they are inconsistent with such a classification because
they recognize that the coal owner has the limited right to use the space
in connection with the coal mining operation. Thus, they are more logi-
cally explained on the basis that the coal owner's incorporeal interest, with
respect to the underground space, is broader in scope than the surface
rights which are included as a part of it. The incorporeal interest
includes the exclusive right to use the mined-out space so long as the
mining operation continues. In terms of policy, such a result also makes
sense. It is consistent with the needs of the underground mining opera-
tion, and it does not interfere with any reasonable expectations of the
plaintiffs were still owners ... with a right which could not be invaded by the defendant,
except for the purpose of removing the coal that which underlaid the surface.
Id. See also id. at 1037 (replying to the contentions by stating that "[clertainly, if such were the
nature of the defendant's right, tihe argument and the authorities cited in support of it would be
applicable and of controlling force ...
59. Id at 1037.
60. id.
61. The court says, for example, that there is no allegation -that all the coal in the vein has been
taken out," with the inference that if it had, the case may have been decided differently. Lillibridge,
22 A. at 1039.
62. Lillibridge, 22 A. at 1037.
63. Webber v. Vogel, 42 A. 4 (Pa. 1899); Moore v. Indian Camp Coal Co., 80 N.E. 6 (Ohio
1908); Middleton v. Harlin Wallins Coal Co., 66 S.W.2d 30 (Ky. 1933).
64. See Int'l Salt Co. v. Ceostow, 697 F. Supp. 1258 (W.D.N.Y. 1988).
65. See id at 1267.
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servient owner. The surface owner has no reasonable expectation of using
that space while the mining operation continues, and rarely thereafter,
and it is difficult to see how its use by the coal owner could be said to
increase the burden on the servient estate.
The issue of the ownership of space occupied by oil and gas has been
litigated with results similar to the coal cases: the space is owned by the
residual fee owner rather than the mineral owner.6s This issue becomes
material in gas storage cases in determining whether the oil and gas
owner, or the residual fee owner, is entitled to be paid for the gas storage
rights. In nearly all states, whether they classify the oil and gas interest as
corporeal or incorporeal, and regardless of whether there is native gas
present in the formation, the residual fee owner is generally successful in
such litigation. 67 In this area, as in the coal area, the fact that the residual
fee owner is regarded as owning the space occupied by the minerals
clearly indicates that the mineral owner's interest is nothing more than a
right of access to land for the limited purpose of removing a particular
substance. It should therefore be classified as an incorporeal interest
known as a profit a prendre.
2. Oil and Gas Cases
As indicated above, some courts have decided oil and gas cases simi-
larly to the coal cases and labeled the oil and gas interest as corporeal, and
they have utilized the "ownership in place" device as the basis for doing
so. A number of states have rejected the "ownership in place" characteri-
zation, however, and with it the corporeal classification.6
In the early Pennsylvania case which first considered the ownership
theory, the court concluded that the coal cases did not provide an appro-
priate analogy. 69 This was due to what the court perceived to be the natu-
ral state in which oil and gas existed. It was then thought that oil and gas
flowed beneath the surface in rivers. Since oil which was under any given
tract at one moment might be beneath a neighboring tract the next
moment, it was thought impossible to use the corporeal or ownership in
place theory which the coal cases had utilized. Instead an analogy was
made to the body of law relating to wild animals which were referred to as
66. See infra note 67.
67. See Ellis v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 450 F. Supp. 412 (E.D.OkIh 1978), aff'd 609 F.2d 436
(10th. Cir. 1979); Tate v. United Fuel Gas Co., 71 S.E.2d 65 (1952); but see WitLIAMs & MEEaS,
supra note 24, § 338.2. The one state which held for the mineral owner in this situation is Kentucky.
See Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Smallwood, 252 S.W.2d 866 (Ky. 1952). Kentucky is one of
the states which does not follow the ownership doctrine developed in the coal cases, but instead,
classifies the oil and gas interest as incorporeal. See infra note 81. If the ownership theory were to
have any impact on this issue, it would seem that Kentucky would take the opposite position.
68. See infra note 72.
69. Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. De Witt, 18 A. 724, 725 (Pa. 1889).
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animalsferrae naturae.7° Such animals were not owned while in a state of
nature, but became the property of the first person to reduce them to
possession. Building on this analogy, the court referred to oil and gas as
minerals ferrae naturae, and held that they were not subject to being
owned until reduced to possession.7' Such a holding would seem to
require the conclusion that interests in oil and gas, when severed from the
surface, were incorporeal.
Several other courts adopted the reasoning of the Pennsylvania
court, with its incorporeal classification, 72 but at a very early time the pos-
sessory or corporeal approach began to gain acceptance. In fact, Penn-
sylvania joined the movement and reversed its position.7" Some of the
courts adopting the corporeal approach pointed out that the original
Pennsylvania decision had been based upon erroneous conclusions about
the manner in which oil and gas exists in its natural state.74 It does not
flow beneath the earth, but is trapped under pressure in airtight forma-
tions and remains fixed in place until a low pressure point, in the form of
a well bore, is introduced into the formation.75 This new information
made it possible to base the law of oil and gas upon an ownership in place
or corporeal theory, according to the courts adopting it.76
The corporeal approach was still required to cope with the fact that
oil and gas does move within the formation when a low pressure point is
introduced. As a result, oil or gas which is produced in a well near a
boundary may have come from beneath the adjoining tract. The owner-
ship in place theory was required to make an accommodation for that fact,
and it did so by accepting the rule of capture, under which ownership of
any given quantity of oil or gas may be lost if it is produced through a well
bottomed under an adjoining tract.77
This approach is invalid for several reasons. First of all, if the corpo-
real classification is dependent upon the ownership in place theory, as
seems to be agreed by the courts adopting it, and if that classification was
of questionable validity when applied to solid minerals, then it would
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Townsend v. State, 47 N.E. 19 (In. 1897); Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co.. 49 N.E. 399
(Ohio 1897); Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Emmerson, 131 N.E. 645 (I11. 1921).
73. See John N. Sawyer, Interests Created by Oil and Gas Leases in Pennsylvania, 4 UNIV. OF
Prrr. L. REv. 274 (1938) (citing authorities).
74. Id. at 274. "The earlier courts with a knowledge as yet imperfect of the true characteristics of
oil and gas, placed too great an emphasis on their fugitive characteristics... ." Id. See also Elliff v.
Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558 (1948). "In the light of modem scientific knowledge these early
analogies have been disproved, and courts generally have come to recognize that oil a gan s, as
commonly found in underground reservoirs, are securely entrapped in a static condition .... Id
75. id.
76. See Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil and Gas Co., 254 S.W. 290 (Tex. 1923).
77. See Elliff, 210 S.W.2d at 561 ("This migratory character of oil and gas has given rise to the
so-called rule or law of capture.").
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seem clear that such a classification cannot be appropriate when applied
to oil and gas. The very fact that the theory must be modified by the rule
of capture is an indication of its inappropriateness. There can be little
difference between an approach which holds the substances to be
unowned and one which takes the position that they are owned, but that
the ownership is lost if produced by a neighbor. The most damning evi-
dence of the unsoundness of this approach, however, is the fact that
neither the commentators nor the courts can agree on whether a state's
decisions place it in one camp or the other.7 8 Furthermore, in an effort to
explain the decisions, the writers have come up with even more dubious
distinctions such as the "qualified ownership" theory79 and the "owner-
ship of strata" theory.80
Illustrating the difficulty in differentiating the theories, one court
recited both theories in succeeding paragraphs, apparently without realiz-
ing that they were different.81 Furthermore, the decisions in a given state
are sometimes contrary to the theory which the state purports to follow,8 2
and the leading writers in the field have concluded that the results in
decided cases do not seem to depend upon the theory which the state has
adopted. 3
3. Timber Cases
The timber cases were started down the same road as the mineral
cases until the process was stopped by the Uniform Commercial Code.
Those cases tended to emphasize the ownership of the substance itself,
and to conclude that such ownership must necessarily result in a corpo-
real, possessory interest in the land.s4 However, since timber occupies
the surface of the land and, therefore, interferes with surface use prior to
removal, different issues are presented than with respect to minerals.
78. In the leading authority in the field, the authors prepared a table in which they compared
hov they and six other writers have classified each of the states which have considered the question.
See WLMANIs & MEYERS, supra note 24, § 203 at 32. There is disagreement as to seven of the 24
states which have been classified, and in many of the other states, on which there is agreement, the
cases contain inconsistent statements on the subject. See, e.g., William E. Colby, The Law of Oil and
Gas, 31 CAL. L. REv. 357, 386 (1943) (discussing the California cases in which both classifications
have been used).
79. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 24, § 203.2.
80. Id § 203.4.
81. Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 75 S.W.2d 204, 205 (Ky. 1934) (adopting
in successive paragraphs both the ownership and nonownership theories).
82. See ViLLtAs & MEYERs, supra note 24, § 204.5 at 60.1 -.2 (1992) (discussing the holdings
of Texas and Oklahoma on a particular issue and concluding that [fi]f the theory held in these states
were significant in this context, the opposite results would-have been expected.").
83. Id. § 204.9 "[T]he theory held by the state is of little importance apart from its influence on
the classification of mineral, royalty and leasehold interests as corporeal or incorporeal .... " Id. The
authors then consider the importance of the corporeallincorporeal distinction and conclude in Section
211 that it, too, is of "little importance." See id.
84. See, e.g., Lodwick Lumber Co. v. Taylor, 98 S.W. 238 (Tex. 1906); Gabbard v. Sheffield, 200
S.W. 940 (Ky. 1918); Butterfield Lumber Co. v. Guy, 46 So. 78 (Miss. 1908).
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Nonetheless, the overall treatment of the timber cases, when compared to
the mineral cases, provides a great deal of insight into the operation of the
classification system in both areas.
Since use of the land for timber growth precludes almost any other
use of the property, most cases have held that while the timber grantee
owns the timber in place and has a corporeal and possessor) interest in
the land, there is an implied obligation to remove it in a reasonable
time.as It has generally been held that a failure to remove timber within a
reasonable time, or within the time provided in an express provision,
results in loss of any interest in the timber rather than just loss of the right
of removal. 8 The result of the majority approach is to create an interest
which substantively has more resemblance to an incorporeal profit ti pren-
dre than do the interests of mineral owners. The fact that the interest in
the timber itself terminates if the timber is not removed within the time
provided, or within a reasonable time if none is provided, makes it clear
that the interest consists of nothing more than a right of removal. The
time limit on the right of removal is also consistent with the temporary
nature of the interest.
A jurisdiction's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, particu-
larly the 1972 amendment to section 2-107(2),7 would seem to represent
a statutory repudiation of the position that severed timber interests are
corporeal interests in the real estate. Originally, section 2-107(2) pro-
vided that a contract for the sale of timber to be cut was a contract for the
sale of goods if the timber was to be cut by the seller.8s The 1972 amend-
ment to section 2-107(2) defines all contracts for the sale of timber to be
cut as contracts for the sale of goods, regardless of who is to cut it. While
the Code only refers to contracts, and might therefore leave open the
question of the effect of a timber deed, it would seem that all timber
transactions would be covered by the Code. The litigated transactions
typically involve a single document in which the landowner "give[s] and
grant[s] ... the right, privilege and option to purchase... the standing
timber,""9 or similar language. One court, construing such a document,
said that it could see no difference between a contract for sale of the
85. See Hall v. Eastman Gardener & Co., 43 So. 2 (Miss. 1907); Union Sawmill Co. v. Agerton,
25 S.W.2d 13 (Ark. 1930); Hudson v. Cox, 274 S.W. 1118 (Ky. 1925). See also 52 AM. Jue. 2D Logs
and Timber § 37 (citing other cases).
86. Lamers v. Anderson, 139 P. 2d 482 (Idaho 1943). Some courts have gone so far as to hold
that title to timber that has been cut is lost if it is not removed within the time stated in the contract
or deed. Union Sawmill Co., 25 S.W.2d at 14. Most courts, however, would probably hold that only
the title to standing timber was lost. See e.g. Richmond Land Co. v. Watson, 107 S.W. 1045 (Mo.
1908); Erskine v. Savage, 51 A. 242 (Me. 1901).
87. U.C.C. 1972 Proposed Amendments, limber cmt c. at 1010 Official Text 1990 (West ed.
1991).
88. I
89. See, e.g., United States v. 3035.73 Acres of Land, 650 F.2d 938, 939 (8th Cir. 1981).
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timber and a conveyance of the timber.90 Furthermore, even if the trans-
action involved both a contract and a conveyance in separate documents,
it would seem irrational to hold that the contract is for the sale of goods
but that the subject matter becomes real estate when the time arrives for
performance.
The Code provision only applies to timber "to be cut,"9' 1 and that,
too, would seem to leave room for the operation of previous law with
respect to conveyances or contracts for the sale of timber that was not to
be cut. Such a transaction would seem to involve a contradiction in
terms, however. The value of timber can only be realized if it is cut.
While it might be possible to envision a transfer of timber that was to be
left standing in perpetuity or a transfer of all timber now standing or to
germinate and grow in the future,9' such a transfer would more properly
be regarded as a transfer of the residual fee interest in the land on which
the timber stood. This would be true because there would be little other
use to which the property could be put by the residual owner, and also
because the renewal of the timber resource does not depend upon human
activity. Such an interest would therefore seem to be perpetual. Most
courts, for these reasons, have construed such conveyances as requiring
that the timber be cut within a reasonable time.
The Code appears to classify timber as goods in all transactions. This
repudiates the courts' attempts to apply the mineral law approach to
transactions which sever the timber interest from the residual fee. Super-
ficially, this approach seems to incorporate the same fallacy that was
involved in the mineral law cases-it emphasizes the rights in the sub-
stance being conveyed. The problem with the reasoning in the mineral
law cases, however, was not just with the conclusion that the substances
were owned in place, but that the interest was therefore a corporeal, or
unlimited, interest in the land itself. The Code treatment of timber rights
seems to take the opposite direction and deemphasize the interest in the
land." That there is an interest in the land which must accompany the
ownership of the timber, however, cannot be denied. 5 The timber
90. Id. at 940.91. U.C.C. § 2-107 (West 1991).
92. Some cases have come close to allowing such an interest based upon the analogy to mineral
cases. See, e.g., Butterfield Lumber Co. v. Guy, 46 So. 78 (Miss. 1908); Lodwick Lumber Co. v.
Taylor, 98 S.W. 238 (Tex. 1906); Gabbard v. Sheffield, 200 S.W. 940 (1918).
93. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (discussing the obligation to remove timber
within a reasonable time).
94. The Code, in fact, tends to deemphasize title as a basis for resolving specific issues between
parties to a transaction involving the transfer of property. See U.C.C § 2-401 and Official Comments
(vest ed. 1991).
95. The situation resembles that In which a structure or a piece of equipment is sold and the
transferee must be given access to the land on which it is located in order to remove it. The right in
the land in that situation is frequently called a license coupled with an interest, but it is generally
recognized as being little different from an easement. See THOMAS, supra note ", LYcEEsn 64.03(d).
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owner, even if the timber is classified as goods, must have a right of access
to the land for the purpose of removing it. This access right would seem
to be a profit i prendre. To the extent that the Code gives content to that
right, the Code is simply regulating rights in land.
Both timber and mineral cases closely resemble cases in which courts
have had to define the interest in land which exists when one person has
an interest in something which is considered to be part of the real estate
of another. Thus, when one acquires a structure or other object which is
attached to the land of another, the courts must deal with the right of
access to the land possessed by the owner of the structure or other
object.96 In those cases, there is no agonizing over the ownership of the
object in place or the effect that it might have on the interest in the land
on which the thing is located. It is generally recognized that the interest
in the real estate, which must accompany ownership of the object is incor-
poreal. It is most often called a license coupled with an interest. 7 The
parallel to the timber and mineral cases extends even further. If the
structure or other object is not removed within the time allowed, be it an
expressly fixed time or one implied based upon reasonableness, title to
the object is lost.98
Although the interest in these cases is called a license coupled with
an interest, most writers recognize the interest as an easement.99 Since
easements and profits are generally regarded as identical, those cases
seem to stand for the proposition that the interest in minerals or timber
should also be labeled as incorporeal.
B. EFFECT OF THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH
The classification of these interests as corporeal was not an end in
itself. It was for the purpose of extending to the mineral owner the bene-
fit of substantive rules which were only available to those with corporeal
interests.' °0 Examples include the rules relating to transferability and
divisibility,' 0' implications of adverse use,' 02 the right to use mined-out
96. See ict for a discussion of such cases.
97. See, e.g., Ingalls v. St. Paul M. & M. Ry. Co., 40 N.W. 524 (Minn. 1888); Rogers v. Cox, 96
Ind. 157 (1884).
98. See Lange & Christ Box & Lumber Co. Inc., v. Haught, 52 S.E.2d 695 (W.Va. 1949).
99. See, e.g., CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND 36 (2d ed. 1947).
100. There have been many decisions in which the result was said to depend upon the
corporeal/incorporeal classification. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 24, § 210. However, those
authors conclude that the distinction is of little importance. Id. § 211.
101. See CaldweU 1, 31 Pa. at 480 (stating that minerals beneath the surface are transfered by
deed).




space for a continuing mining operation on other lands,'0 and immunity
from application of rules relating to abandonment."' 4
However, nothing inherent in the corporeal/incorporeal classification
system, as those terms are defined today, requires a particular result in
the application of any of these rules to mineral interests. Whatever
effects were said to flow from the use of those terms in the past, those
terms today are simply used to differentiate between the residual fee and
those lesser interests which have been carved out of it. That classification
system does not address the policies that may be involved in the various
issues. The current approach of the mineral law cases, in which it is said
that because an interest is corporeal, a certain result must follow, is there-
fore invalid.105 That is not to say that the result must change in regard to
any of the situations under discussion. If the result currently being
reached represents good policy, it should not be changed. If it does not
represent good policy, it should be changed. It may be that the result
currently being reached with respect to some of these rules would be the
same even if a more rational, policy-based analysis of the substantive rules
involved were used. An example is the application of the substantive rule
with respect to the use of mined-out space. 106 Furthermore, some of the
results which were thought to follow from the corporeal/incorporeal clas-
sification have long since lost their connection to that process. The issues
involved with respect to transferability and divisibility as well as those
relating to separate assessability for taxation purposes are examples.
Those issues are not often litigated today. It is generally recognized that
whether mineral interests are classed as corporeal or incorporeal, they are
separately assessable for tax purposes.' 07 There is seldom a contention
103. See Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co., 22 A. 1035 (Pa. 1891) (granting a right to carry coal
through existing mined-out space on adjacent tract).
104. See Hummel v. McFadden, 150 A.2d 856 (Pa. 1959); Uphoff v. Trustees of Tufts College,
184 N.E. 213 (IUl. 1932) (noting that a corporeal hereditament cannot be the subject of
abandonment).
105. See WILIAMS & MEYRs, supra note 24, § 201 at 18.
In the adjudication of controversies concerning interests in oil and gas, some courts have
applied a seemingly simple syllogistic logic; . . . The syllogism requires conceptual
classification of the oil and gas interest in question since classification is an essentialingredient of the syllogism. It proceeds as follows: (1) [m]ajor premise: statement of a
rule applicable to an interest of a particular type, e.g. corporeal interests or incorporeal
interests; (2) minor premise: the interest with which this case is concerned is of this
variety; (3) conclusion: the consequences mentioned in the major premise are applicable.
106. See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
107. See Atlantic Oil Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 446 P.2d 1006 (Cal. 1968) (holding that
royalty interests are not subject to separate assessment, but that it is a matter of construing a statute
which requires that minerals be assessed).
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today that the kind of exclusive profits which are involved in the extrac-
tion of fossil fuels are indivisible or nontransferable.108
There may be some situations, however, in which the recognition
that an interest is temporary and limited in nature on the one hand, or
general or residual on the other, would argue for a different result.
Examples include the rules with respect to adverse users and abandon-
ment. In both situations, with some illogical exceptions, the courts cur-
rently purport to apply rules created for residual or corporeal interests to
oil, gas, and coal. Sound, policy-based analysis would seem to require the
opposite res.lt.
It is with respect to the implications of surface use during periods of
nonuse of the mineral estate that the decisions become particularly con-
fusing. The options in the common law are to deal with this under the
doctrine of adverse possession if the interest is considered to be posses-
sory, or corporeal, and under the doctrine of prescription if it is consid-
ered to be nonpossessory, or incorporeal. Indeed, one of the early coal
cases recognized that corporeal/incorporeal classification should have
such an effect. In Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co.,"° the court
stated: "[P]ossession of the mineral may be recovered by ejectment, and
title to it may be acquired by adverse possession under the statute of limi-
tations, though not by prescription, because it is not an incorporeal
right."'10
Neither of these options, however, provides an adequate means of
dealing with the problem of extended nonuse of the mineral estate.
While the doctrine of adverse possession purports to provide both a
means of creating and terminating a mineral interest, it rarely functions as
a means of terminating such an interest. The prescription approach has
never been explored with respect to mineral interests by the common law
jurisdictions. As developed by the common law courts, with respect to
surface estates, however, it has been used not only as a means of acquir-
ing easements but also as a means of terminating them when the acts of
the servient owner are inconsistent with the existence of the easement."'
Mere nonuse of the area occupied by the servitude will not terminate an
easement. Thus, the only means of dealing with the question of termina-
tion of incorporeal interests due to extended nonuse in common law juris-
dictions is under the rules of abandonment. The common law courts have
108. See Hinds v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 591 P.2d 697 (Okla. 1979); Cowling v. Deep Vein Coal
Co., 183 F.2d 652 (7th. Cir. 1950). See also JOHN E. CIUBBEr AND CORWIN W. JOHNSON, ;RINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF PROPER tY 375 (3d ed. 1989).
109. 22 A. 1035 (Pa. 1891).
110. Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co., 22 A. 1035, 1036 (Pa. 1891).
111. ResATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 506 (1944) ("An easement is extinguished by a use of the
servient tenement by the possessor of it which would be privileged if, and only if, the easement did
not exist. .. ").
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repeatedly said that mere nonuse, no matter how long, will not amount to
abandonment." 2
Part of the problem with the adverse possession doctrine is that it
entails the physical or possessory concept in which the mineral interest is
regarded as a separate tract of land. Inherent in that concept is the idea
that possessory acts with respect to the surface have no implications with
respect to the mineral estate.
The rules of adverse possession which are applied to the mineral
estate must take into account, in some situations, however, the fact that
the mineral estate is not a buried tract of land, as the common law insists.
If an adverse possessor begins possession of the surface before a sever-
ance of the mineral estate has occurred, for example, the possessor will,
after the expiration of the period required for acquisition of title, acquire
title to the mineral estate as well as the surface."13 This is true even
though the record owner may sever the mineral estate the day after the
possession began. The adverse possession period will run against the sev-
ered mineral owner in that case. The result is that the mineral estate will
not be regarded as a separate tract of land, in that acts with relation to the
surface alone will result in acquisition of title to the severed mineral inter-
est. If, however, the severance occurs one day before the adverse posses-
sion begins, the buried tract of land syndrome will become operative and
the statute will not run against the severed mineral owner unless the sur-
face owner actually begins producing minerals.114
There have been many explanations of this seeming inconsistency.
While it has been said that there is no cause of action in favor of the
severed mineral owner in the latter situation and that the statute there-
fore cannot run," 5 that is equally true in the first situation. It has also
been argued that "[t]he reason for the rule lies in the fact that the true
owner of a mineral interest would not be alerted to a hostile claim on the
part of an occupant who takes no steps to penetrate the surface."" 6 That
argument seems to be based upon the idea that the mineral owner who
purchases after the adverse possession begins will have notice of the
adverse possessor's claim because of the presence of the possessor at that
time. The premise seems to be that a purchaser is obligated to investigate
at the time of the purchase, but that there is never an occasion for a
purchaser, who takes prior to the commencement of adverse possession,
112. See, e.g., Lindsay v. Clark, 69 S.E.2d 342,344 (Va. 1952) (finding that "mere non-use of an
easement created by deed, for a period however long, will not amount to abandonment[ ]").
113. See WNILUAMS & MIEYRS, supra note 24, § 224.1 at 350 (listing a number of cases
regarding acquisition of mineral and surface rights by an adverse possessor).
114. I& § 346.1.
115. Id. § 347.
116. Cerhard v. Stephens, 442 P.2d 692, 719 (Cal. 1968). See also WILLIAMS & MMRas, supra
note 24, §§ 224, 224.1, at 346.1, 347.
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to make such an investigation. Even in the case quoted above, however, it
seemed to make no difference that the severed mineral owner, whose
interest predated the beginning of adverse possession, had actual notice
of the claim as a result of execution of oil and gas leases by the surface
owner, or by other means." 7 In view of the apparent irrelevance of
actual notice, it seems that notice, or the lack of it, is not an adequate
explanation for the inconsistency.
Perhaps the real basis for the distinction is found in the effort to treat
land ownership, and more particularly mineral ownership, as a thing
which is capable of being physically possessed. In order for the mineral
estate to have that quality, however, it must be separated from the sur-
face. If a trespasser has physical possession of the entire fee at the time of
the conveyance which severs the minerals from the surface, the record
owner does not have the ability to physically deliver possession of the
mineral estate to another by such a conveyance. There can, therefore, for
purposes of the adverse possession doctrine, be no severance in those
situations. If, however, conveyance is made before the adverse possession
begins, the record owner, who has the ability to physically deliver the
mineral estate to a grantee, can do so, and there is no problem with
regarding the mineral estate as having been severed in that situation.
The common law, in other words, can conceive of the severed min-
eral estate as a buried tract of land which can be physically possessed if it
is separated from the surface by one who has physical possession of the
entire interest in the land, but not if it is severed when the possession of
the entire interest in the land is in a disseizor. If the mineral estate is
successfully severed from the surface by one who has the ability to do so,
then acts performed with respect to the surface no longer have any pos-
sessory significance with respect to the now separate mineral estate. It
can now be regarded as a separate, but buried tract of land; if the law of
adverse possession is to operate with respect to it, the basis must be an
actual possession of the minerals themselves.
The doctrine of adverse possession as applied by the common law to
the mineral estate provides a means of terminating the mineral estate due
to extended nonuse only when the mineral estate is severed after the
period of adverse possession begins. It will therefore provide no remedy
in most situations. When the surface user is a successor in interest to the
person who severed the mineral estate, the law of adverse possession will
not operate in favor of such a surface user."'




The problem created by the timing of the surface trespass with rela-
tion to the severance of the mineral estate, then, is a result of the effort to
regard the mineral interest in the same physical sense as the residual fee
is conceived. While both should be regarded as intangibles, the problem
addressed here is created by the effort of the courts to regard the severed
mineral estate in the same way as a residual fee. Treating the residual fee
as a physical thing may not be problematic; because it may be roughly
equivalent to treating it as the residual interest in the land. It is when the
mineral estate is regarded in that light that bad policy results begin to
occur.
The incorporeal option, which, in common law jurisdictions, offers
only the possibility of loss by abandonment, does not provide any better
solution to the problem of long nonuse of the mineral estate than does the
doctrine of adverse possession.
The doctrine of abandonment, as has been pointed out, does not
terminate mineral interests solely because of long nonuse. Furthermore,
it is seldom used as a means of terminating unused oil and gas interests
even in those jurisdictions which classify those interests as incorporeal. In
fact, California appears to be the only state that has, in a straightforward
way, applied the abandonment doctrine to severed mineral estates." 9
The rest of the states, regardless of how they classify the mineral interest,
either do not apply the rules of abandonment' 20 or apply them in an une-
ven and irrational way.' 2 1 It is not clear why there is such a reluctance to
use the abandonment doctrine to terminate long unused mineral
interests.
There is nothing inherent in the ownership of land, and certainly not
in the ownership of minerals, which precludes the loss of corporeal inter-
ests by abandonment. The rule concerning abandonment appears to
come from an era in which title to land was regarded as a physical thing.
In fact, the civil law does not appear to have such a rule.1 22 In the com-
mon law, however, title, being a physical thing, had to have a continuous
119. See id The court applied the rules of abandonment to severed oil and gas interests as a
consequence of that state's incorporeal classification of such interests. Il The only scholarly
authority available to the court was the Williams & Meyers treatise, TnE LAW OF OIL AND GAS, and
that work took the position that the incorporeal classification should have such an effect. Id at 719.
The Williams & Meyers position was based entirely upon the logic involved in extending rules relating
to surface incorporeal interests to mineral ownership. See also Polston, Marketability of Mineral
Titles, supra note 36. at 73 n.3 (discussing the basis of Williams & Meyers' logic).
120. See, e.g., Jilek v. Chicago, Wilmington, and Franklin Coal Co., 47 N.E.2d 96 (IlL 1943); see
also Polston, Marketability of Mineral Titles, supra note 36.
121. See infra notes 132-137 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinction between
transfer by deed or lease and the effect of that distinction upon the susceptibility of the interest to
loss by abandonment.
122. See Allen v. West Lumber Co., 244 S.W. 499 (Tex. Ct. App. 1922) (applying Spanish law
which would have been applicable in Texas at the time of occurrence and holding that the civil law
allows loss by abandonment).
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existence. There could be no gap in seisin.123 Title had to be somewhere
in someone at all times. Obviously, it could not be abandoned, because
that would involve the impossible (i.e. a situation in which title did not
exist). This rule applied only to corporeal interests such as the fee. In
fact, applying the rule to mineral interests would not produce the result
which the early common law feared, because terminating a mineral title,
then or now, would not create a situation in which the interest was
unowned even for an instant. Abandonment of a mineral interest causes
the interest to revert to the owner of the residual estate.'4 The residual
estate is simply freed of the burden of the mineral servitude.
Even though the reason for the rule relating to abandonment has
ceased to exist, the rule continues to be applied to the interests which
were classified as corporeal at the time the rule was adopted.125 It does
not make sense, however, to insert mineral ownership into that system
and apply to it rules which were based upon the existence of a quality
which mineral ownership was not deemed to possess at the time the rules
were adopted. The new meaning of corporeal, referring only to the
residual, or general possessory right, and not requiring that the interest be
capable of transfer by livery of seisin, may have seemed to enable the
court to label coal ownership as corporeal; but it borders on the absurd to
then give that ownership the qualities of the old corporeal interest and
apply to it the rules which grew out of those qualities.
While the coal cases have uniformly applied the no abandonment
rule and would no doubt defend that result as a necessary consequence of
the corporeal classification, there is actually no necessary relationship
between the two.' 2 6 In fact, if the coal interest is properly regarded as
simply a right of access to land for the limited purpose of removing
whatever coal is present, it would seem to follow that the interest termi-
nates when the quest is abandoned.
The decisions from the oil and gas area have, for the most part, taken
the same position as the coal cases with respect to the abandonment
issue."2 7 The existence of some notable exceptions"z makes clear, how-
ever, that there is no necessary link between the corporeal classification
123. See Cristofani v. Bd. of Educ., 632 A.2d 447 (Md. App. 1993) (providing the current rule of
law and supporting authority).
124. Geard, 442 P.2d at 711 (holding that the effect of abandoning a mineral interest is that it
will revert to the owner of the interest out of which it was carved).
125. See, e.g., Hummell v. McFadden, 150 A.2d 856, 862 (Pa. 1959) (determining that "[a]
corporeal hereditament cannot be the subject of abandonment.").
126. See, e.g., Aggregate Supply Co. v. Sewall, 122 S.E.2d 580 (Ga. 1961) (holding that title to
an interest in sand and gravel could not be lost by abandonment because it was corporeal, but
determining that it was corporeal because it was a profit a prendre).
127. See Polston, Marketability of Mineral 7Ttle.s, supra note 36 (providing citations for cases
illustrating the similarities between oil and gas and coal case positions).
128. See infra note 135 for authorities cited within.
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and the application of rules relating to abandonment. In fact, it is difficult
to find any unifying factor in those decisions. It is true that the California
courts, which have identified that state with the incorporeal holding in
their more definitive statements on the subject,12 9 have held that the
interest is subject to loss by abandonment.130 Other jurisdictions which
have classified the interest as incorporeal, however, have held that it is not
subject to loss by abandonment.' 31 The Texas decisions, which represent
the clearest statement of the ownership in place, or corporeal position,132
have held that the mineral fee is not subject to loss by abandonment when
transferred by deed,' 33 but is subject to such loss when transferred by an
oil and gas lease." Other states, applying both corporeal and incorporeal
theories, have reached the same result as Texas.'- s There seems to be no
basis for the distinction made in the Texas cases between transfers by
deed and transfers by lease; if a distinction is to be made based on the
method of transfer, it should have the opposite effect.
The distinction between transfers by deed and by lease is invalid
because both kinds of transfers generally give to the transferee the entire
interest in the oil and gas in fee. The duration of the interests in the two
situations may differ. The oil and gas lease always creates a fee simple
determinable.' 36 The mineral conveyance or reservation may be perpet-
ual, but frequently also utilizes a fee simple determinable with the same
kind of conditions as the oil and gas lease.' 3 7 It is true that the transac-
tions are functionally different in that the oil and gas lease contemplates
development by the transferee while the transfer, or reservation, by deed
does not.'a However, the difference would not seem to justify treating
the mineral transferee as a corporeal owner and the oil and gas lessee as
an incorporeal owner. In fact, since the distinction is supposedly based
upon possession or lack of possession, the oil and gas lessee, if anyone,
129. E.g. Callahan v. Martin, 43 P.2d 788 (Cal. 1935). But see William E. Colby The Law of
Oil and Gas, 31 CAL. L REv. 357, 386 (1943) (discussing the California decisions which have taken
the opposite position).
130. Gerhard, 442 P.2d. at 706.
131. See supra note 120.
132. See Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil and Gas Co., 254 S.W. 290 (Tex. 1928); 29 A.L.R.
566 (1923).
133. Loomis v. Gulf Oil Corp., 123 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Ct. App. 1938).
134. There are a number of Texas cases which so hold, but some writers argue that those cases
are applying a special limitation contained in the oil and gas lease. See Wi.uAMS & MmRS supra
note 24, § 210.1. See also A. IV. Walker, Jr., The Nature of Property Interests Created by an Oil and
Gas Lease in Texas, 7 Tx. L. REv. 565 (1929) (providing a list of relevant cases).
135. See Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Goode, 254 S.W. 345 (Ark. 1923) (decided in an ownership
state); Cameron v. Lebow, 366 S.W.2d 164 (Ky. 1960) (decided in a nonownership state).
136. Oil and gas leases are typically for a fixed primary term and as long thereafter as oil and gas
is produced. See RICHARD W. HEMINcGvAY, THE LAW oF OIL AND GAS 263 (3d. ed. 1991).
137. Id. at 108.
138. Loomis v. Gulf Oil Corp., 123 S.W.2d 501, 503-04 (Tex. Ct. App. 1938) (holding that the
instrument was a deed and that there were no implied developmental obligations and deciding that
the interest was not subject to loss by abandonment).
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should be treated as a possessor because the oil and gas lessee is the one
that will actually remove the minerals from the ground. Recall that in the
coal cases, in which the corporeal/incorporeal distinction had its begin-
ning, there was an emphasis on the extent to which the coal owner would
have physical possession of the substance.1 39 The mineral transferee, on
the other hand, is the owner of a speculative interest who will never pos-
sess anything other than a share of the money realized from development.
It is clear that the common law does not deal rationally nor ade-
quately with the implications of long nonuse of the mineral estate. Evi-
dence of a regime schizophrenically torn between livery of seisin and a
more abstract approach to ownership is provided by the insistence, in all
jurisdictions, that prolonged nonuse of the mineral estate must be dealt
with under the irrational and uneven application of the doctrine of aban-
donment and the physically oriented rules of adverse possession.
The complete confusion about the doctrines of adverse possession,
prescription, and abandonment and the relationship of those doctrines to
the theory of ownership currently employed is illustrated by the opinion
in Gerhard v. Stephens.140 In that case, the court applied the doctrine of
abandonment to the oil and gas interest, but not to solid minerals, based
upon the incorporeal classification of oil and gas interests and the corpo-
real classification of solid minerals. 141 Despite classifying oil and gas as
incorporeal, the court applied the doctrine of adverse possession to oil
and gas interests, including those interests which are severed prior to
commencement of adverse possession and those severed after.-4'
Implicit in the latter distinction is the ownership in place or buried tract
of land concept. Furthermore, the court discussed the possibility of the
surface owner acquiring prescriptive rights by excluding the mineral
owner from the surface, implicitly rejecting the ownership in place theory
and instead assuming that acts with respect to the surface alone may be
the basis for acquisition of a prescriptive right.143 The court assumed all
of this without recognizing the inconsistencies in its discussion.
The suggestion in the Gerhard decision that the residual owner
could acquire prescriptive rights by excluding the mineral owner from
access to the surface is criticized in the leading oil and gas text by Wil-
liams and Meyers. 144 The suggestion is characterized as "doctrinal error,"
139. Furthermore, in the first of the Pennsylvania coal cases, Caldwell I, 31 Pa. 475, the
document at issue was similar to an oil and gas lease in that it appeared to give only the
developmental right rather than to transfer the fee in the coal. The court there held that the exclusive
right to develop the mineral amounted to ownership. Ild. at 481.
140. Gerhard v. Stephens. 442 P.2d 692, 718 (Cal. 1968).
141. Id at 705-06.
142. Id. at 719.
143. Id. at 719-20.
144. Wi1LTNS & MEYERS, supra note 24, § 224.4.
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because it is inconsistent with the ownership in place doctrine.' 45 The
most that could be acquired by excluding the mineral owner from access
to the surface, according to those authors, is a termination of the surface
easements which are an incident of mineral ownership.146 That argument
assumes, of course, that the ownership in place concept is valid, and that
surface rights are easements appurtenant to the buried mineral estate.
Indeed, the whole idea that the mineral owner's surface rights are based
upon easement is derived from the ownership in place concept. If that
concept was rejected and the mineral right was treated as a profit t pren-
dre, the question of surface rights would simply be dealt with as one
involving the scope of the right. Recent developments in the area of sur-
face rights may, in fact, reflect an implicit rejection of the ownership in
place concept.'47
The idea that acts of the residual owner with respect to the surface
alone should be considered to be adverse to the mineral owner, whether
those acts are inconsistent with the dominant owner's rights or not, is
taken from the civil law approach to the problem of long nonuse of the
mineral interest. That approach is used in Louisiana, where prescription
is a means of both acquiring and terminating mineral interests, and it
provides the most rational and effective means of dealing with the prob-
lem here considered. The doctrine of liberative prescription, as it is
called, originates in a statutory provision' 48 designed for surface servi-
tudes but applied now to mineral interests.149 It treats the use of the
servient estate as being adverse to the dominant estate during periods of
nonuse of the dominant estate. Under that doctrine, if a mineral interest
is not in production for any continuous period of ten years, it terminates
145. Id. (recognizing that a different analysis would be appropriate in a jurisdiction which
classifies oil and gas interests as incorporeal).
146. Id.
147. Recent legislation in several states creates an obligation on the part of the mineral
developer to pay for access to the surface. Some of this legislation seems to assume that there has
always been such an obligation despite the repeated statements in judicial opinions that the mineral
owner has an easement in the surface for access. That legislation and its underlying assumption may
reflect the fact that the ownership in place theory, on which the easement approach is based, is
contray to reason, and has been so regarded even in the industries which depend upon it. Such
statutes, which are inconsistent with the existence of surface rights based on easement and seem to
require payment even in those situations in which easements are expressly created, would certainly
seem less objectionable on constitutional grounds if the ownership in place approach is rejected. See
generally Ronald NV. Polston, Surface Rights of Mineral Owners, What Happens Wihen Judges Make
Law and Nobody Listens, 63 N.D. L REv. 40 (1987) [hereinafter Surface Rights].
148. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 789,3546 (West 1953). See text accompanying supra notes 36-39
for further discussion of liberative prescription.
149. See Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Sailing's Heirs, 91 So. 207 (La. 1920) (applying the
statutory provision to oil and gas interests). While it probably applied to solid minerals at a very early
time, there was little authority on the matter until the adoption of the Mineral Code in 1975. LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31 (West 1989) (providing application to solid minerals in addition to oil and gas).
See Polston, Marketability of Mineral 7Titles, supra note 36, at 82 n.29 (discussing the doctrine of
liberative prescription).
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in favor of the surface owner.' 50 With such a doctrine, there is no need to
apply the rules of abandonment to mineral interests. While the common
law doctrine of prescription, with respect to surface estates, has been used
as a means of both acquiring and terminating incorporeal rights, it will
terminate a servitude only if the use is inconsistent with the existence of
the servitude.' 5 ' It is difficult to conceive of any use of the surface as
being inconsistent with the mineral interest during periods of nonproduc-
tion of the minerals. At any rate, the doctrine of prescription has never
been applied to mineral interests even in those jurisdictions which classify
the mineral interest as incorporeal. While a California court toyed with
the idea, it did so as a part of its consideration of an adverse possession
theory, and rejected it under the facts of the case.' 5
III. LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION: DORMANT MINERALS
STATUTES
Because the courts failed to formulate a rational theory of mineral
ownership and failed to deal adequately with prolonged nonuse of mineral
interests, substantial title problems developed in jurisdictions with estab-
lished extractive mineral industries.'55 The title problems interfered with
ownership to such an extent that legislatures in several states were forced
to adopt statutes to deal with these problems.'-' Those statutes, known as
dormant minerals statutes, typically terminate unused mineral interests
after a specified period of nonuse. The Indiana statute, 5 which has
become the model for several other states,"' provides that if a mineral
interest is unused for a period of twenty years, it will terminate and revert
to the owner of the interest out of which it was carved.15 7 While it states
no theory, it was modeled upon the Louisiana liberative prescription doc-
trine.158 It differs from that doctrine in that it allows an unused mineral
interest to be preserved by the filing a document with the recorder of
150. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31 § 27 (West 1989).
151. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 506 (1944).
152. Gerhard v. Stephens, 442 P.2d 692., 720 (Cal. 1968) (finding that the execution and
recording of leases does not alone provide notice to the true owner of the mineral rights of an adverse
claim).
153. See, e.g., Energetics Limited v. Whitmill, 497 N.W.2d 497, 500 (Mich. 1993) (illustrating
title problems necessitating the genesis of dormant minerals statutes).
154. See Polston, Market-ability of Mineral Titles, supra note 36, at 73 (discussing the
development of dormant minerals statutes).
155. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11 (Burns 1988).
156. See KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 55-16 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. ch. 43-30A (1992);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. ch. 78.22 (West 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. 706.057 (West 1993).
157. The author was responsible for the drafting of the Indiana statute, as well as the briefs
prepared in defense of its constitutionality before the United States Supreme Court. The statute was
upheld against constitutional attack in Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982). Polston, Marketability of
Mineral Titles, supra note 36, at 90.
158. See Polston, Marketability of Mineral itles, supra note 36; see also supra text
accompanying notes 36-39 (discussing the liberative prescription doctrine).
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deeds. 59 There are several other statutes of the same kind, and some of
them purport to have a particular theoretical base. The Michigan statute,
for example, operates on the basis of an abandonment theory.160 If a min-
eral interest is unused for a period of twenty years, it will be considered
abandoned. 161 Ironically, Michigan is regarded as an ownership or corpo-
real state162 and would presumably hold, as a common law principle, that
corporeal interests are not subject to loss by abandonment. The Georgia
statute, on the other hand, provides that possession of the surface, even if
commenced after severance, is deemed to be adverse to the severed min-
eral interest and further provides that seven years of such adverse posses-
sion will give the surface owner title to the mineral estate.16 While it
purports to be based upon an adverse possession theory,' 6 the effect of
the statute is to create a system exactly like the Louisiana liberative pre-
scription doctrine. It is one in which the use of the surface will be
deemed to be adverse to the mineral estate any time that estate is not
being used. Since the statute treats surface use as having significance
with respect to the mineral estate, it has, by implication, abandoned the
buried tract of land approach of the common law. Therefore, the adverse
possession label which the Georgia statute uses to describe the doctrine
does not seem appropriate.
These statutes are clearly designed to cover both oil and gas, as well
as solid minerals. However, the approach of early coal cases, in which the
surface owner was regarded as owning only a thin layer of soil, could, if
carried to an extreme, make the application of these statutes problematic
in some situations. This is particularly true of the prototype dormant min-
eral statute, which was first adopted by Indiana.'6' That statute provides
for the terminated mineral interest to revert to "the owner of the estate
out of which it was carved."16 6 The problem would arise if the owner of
the fee were to convey the surface only, reserving the mineral estate. 617
It might be argued that the mineral estate was the residual estate out of
which the surface layer was carved, and that the statute could not operate
in favor of the "surface owner." If so, the operation of such a statute
would be disrupted. The problem exists only because of the acceptance
159. IND. CODE § 32-5-11-5 (Burns 1988).
160. MICH. ComP. LAVs ANN. § 554.291 (West 1994).
161. 1& § 554.291(a).
162. See Wir.-Ams & MEYERS, supra note 24, § 203, at 32 (listing Michigan as an ownership in
place state).
163. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-168(a) (1991).
164. I& § 44-5-168. See also WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 24, § 203, at 32 (indicating that
it is unknown whether Georgia is an ownership or nonownership state).
165. See IND. CODE ANN. ch. 35-5-11 (Burns 1988).
166. Id § 32-5-11-1 (Burns 1980).
167. See Eardley v. Granville, 3 Ch. D. 826 (1876) (finding that the grantee in such a
conveyance gets only the layer of soil parallel to the surface).
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of the physical approach to the ownership of minerals, however. If a
proper approach to mineral ownership was taken, it would be realized
that the reserved interest in such a conveyance will only exist if there are
minerals under the land, and that it is therefore impossible to regard that
interest as the residual interest in the land.l 6' When that approach is
taken, it seems clear that the dormant minerals statute would operate to
terminate the interest reserved in such a conveyance.
The fact that these statutes ignore, mishandle, or conflict with the
common law theories of mineral ownership provides further evidence that
those theories do not adequately deal with the subject matter. Signifi-
candy, however, those statutes reject the most offensive aspect of the
common law approach to mineral ownership - the total refusal to deal
with the problem created by long nonuse of such interests. The common
law problem could be at least partially solved if such interests were recog-
nized to be similar to the other servitudes and to confer a right of access
to land for the limited purpose of removing a particular substance. Such
rights are by nature temporary, and should be limited in duration to the
time required for removal of the substance. Furthermore, such interests
should be terminated when the quest for the substance has ended.169
The termination could be accomplished by a theory of abandonment or a
doctrine similar to the liberative prescription doctrine of Louisiana, but
the adoption of either would seem to be facilitated by a proper theoretical
approach to the nature of mineral ownership.
IV. A NONTRADITIONAL ALTERNATIVE: DEVELOPMENT OF
A RELATIONAL THEORY
While the incorporeal characterization of mineral interests will come
closer than other traditional concepts to producing results consistent with
good policy, there is no reason, other than respect for tradition, why a
court today should feel obligated to utilize any of those concepts when
dealing with this subject. That is particularly true in view of the fact that
168. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Moore, 48 N.E.2d 400 (Ill. 1943) (holding that a deed conveying
the surface only was, in effect, a reservation of the minerals). But see Deterding v. United States, 69
F. Supp. 214 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (holding, conversely, that conveying the fee for a specific purpose while
reserving most of the beneficial interest resulted in a conveyance of only a servitude).
169. In fact, the oil and gas industry seems to recognize the need for such a system; many
mineral fee transfers today are in fee simple determinable, rather than in the form of a perpetual fee
simple absolute. Thus, the mineral fee will typically be transferred for a primary term ot perhaps,
twenty years and as long thereafter as the minerals are produced. See Fransen v. Eckhardt, 711 P.2d
926 (OkIa. 1985) (holding that even these interests are to be construed to end as soon as possible in
order to avoid the title problems which have resulted in the adoption of dormant minerals statutes).
But see Ronald W. Polston, Recent Developments in Oil and Gas Law, 7 E. MIN. L INsT. 19.02(3)[a]
(Bender 1986) (criticizing Fransen v. Eckhardt. 711 P.2d 926 (Okla. 1985) on the basis that it is




the tradition is based upon doctrinal error. The emphasis should not be
on ownership at all, but on creating rules of fairness to govern the rela-
tionships that arise in the development of mineral resources. Under a
relational approach, 170 courts would be much more free to fashion rules
which are fair to the parties and reflective of good policy.
First of all, the history of the subject prior to the coal cases does not
conclusively point to a property, or ownership, approach. While this kind
of interest was included in the incorporeal classification, and therefore a
real property interest, there were many other contract-like relationships
included in that category. They were included because there was no ade-
quately developed law of contracts into which they could fit.17 ' Many
such relationships are now regarded as entirely contractual. These inter-
ests were all transferred by deed because they could not be transferred by
livery, and those were the only two means of transferring such interests.
The fact that they were transferred by deed may have unduly influenced
the early courts that dealt with mineral ownership.
Furthermore, the incorporeal classification, according to one author,
did not clearly define the most fundamental property relationships which
it included, that is, the easements and licenses, until after the first coal
cases had been decided.'72 In view of that history, and the fact that arbi-
trary removal of mineral ownership from the incorporeal classification
cannot be historically justified, perhaps the proper approach is to take a
totally fresh look at the subject rather than merely correcting the mistake
which was made when the interests were classified as corporeal. Such an
approach might be found in the oil and gas lease cases which take a rela-
tional approach rather than one which emphasizes ownership.
A. THE OIL AND GAS LEASE CASES
There are many judicial pronouncements in the mineral law cases
that are more consistent with a relational approach than with the owner-
170. Much has been written about a relational approach to contract law. See PETER LINZER,
UNCoNTArcs, 1988 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAw 139 (1989) (reviewing literature on the
relational approach). See also PEmE LiNzER, A CONTRACTs AN'riOLocy (Anderson 1989) (providing
citations of-current literature on the relational approach); Charles J. Meyers and Steven M. Crafton,
The Covenant of Further Exploration-Thirty Years Later, 32 RoCK MTN. MIN. L INsT. 1-1, 1-22
(1986) (discussing the relational approach in the oil and gas context); McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d
765 (W. Va. 1984) (Harshburger, J., concurring). The concept of relational contracts is generally a
narrower concept than is used here, however. See generally WILLIAMS & MEYE..S, supra note 24,
§ 802.1. As used here it means nothing more than the idea that courts will give content to
relationships based upon considerations of' fairness and good policy. Id. Professor Merrill used the
relational concept in this broader sense when he said: "What is this but saying that fair dealing on the
part of the lessee requires that he shall not disappoint the reasonable expectations of... the lessor?
MAURICE H. MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASEs, 470 (2d ed. Thomas 1940).
171. See supra notes 3-12 and accompanying text (discussing the development of incorporeal
and corporeal interests as relating to land).
172. See supra note 10.
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ship approach which purports to govern the area. The oil and gas lease
cases may provide the best examples.' 73
The oil and gas lease is as much a conveyance of all interest in the oil
and gas as is a deed which severs the ownership of those minerals from
the surface. While there may be some differences in form, 74 such as that
the oil and gas lease nearly always utilizes a fee simple determinable while
the mineral severance sometimes uses the fee simple absolute, the more
recent trend in conveyancing is for the mineral severance to also use the
fee simple determinable.7 5  In fact, the habendum clause of the typical
term mineral deed is almost identical to that of the oil and gas lease
except that the primary term is usually longer. 176 Thus, a mineral sever-
ance may be for a primary term of twenty years while in the oil and gas
lease it may be for one to five years. In both cases the secondary term is
for "as long thereafter as oil and gas is produced." In fact, there are occa-
sional cases in which it is difficult to determine whether the parties
intended a deed or a lease. 177
When construing a deed, courts have occasionally questioned the
precedential value of cases construing oil and gas leases. 78 The answer
seemed to be that the authorities were interchangeable unless the fact
173. See David E. Pierce, Rethinking the Oil and Gas Lease, 22 TULSA L.J. 445 (1987).
174. The oil and gas lease imposes certain developmental obligations on the lessee, whereas a
transfer of the mineral fee does not create such obligations. That difference is not a result of anything
expressly contained in the two documents, however. It is because the courts have created such an
obligation in an effort to bring fairness to the relationship. It is contained in the implied covenants in
the oil and gas lease. Thus, there is an implied covenant to reasonably develop, and an implied
covenant to protect against drainage. For a treatment of the entire subject of implied covenants, see
generally MERRILL, supra note 170.
175. See supra notes 136-137.
176. The typical habendum clause in an oil and gas lease provides for a primary term of a fixed
period and a secondary term for a period measured by the duration of production.
177. See WILUAMS & MEYEaS, supra note 24, § 205 (discussing the distinction between a deed
and a lease and citing authorities).
178. The older cases construing the term of the oil and gas lease represent an exception to the
relational approach which otherwise has characterized the area. In this situation, the courts have
carried the ownership approach to some harsh extremes. It has been held that if the lessee is a
minute late or a penny short in the payment of delay rentals during the primary term, the lease will
terminate. This is explained on the-basis that mitigating contract doctrines which might relieve the
lessee of the effect of the default are not applicable to the question. The issue is simply whether the
condition upon which the termination of the fee simple determinable estate depends has occurred.
See HEMINGWAY, supra note 136, at 284 for a citation of authorities. It is, in other words, entirely a
property question. The same thing has been true in cases dealing with the secondary term where the
tee simple determinable estate depends upon continued production. See Baldwin v. Blue Stem Oil
Co., 189 P. 920 (1920); Dewell v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 380 P.2d 379 (1963) (holding that
mineral deeds terminate at the end of production). In both areas, however, there has been some
softening of the condition-oriented property approach. With respect to the delay rental cases, for
example, an estoppel defense has been allowed, and the mailbox rule, or a similar rule involving the
depository bank,-has also been used. See HEMINGWAY, supra note 136, at 284-293, for a citation of
authorities. With respect to the cases construing the secondary term provisions of both leases and
deeds, the "temporary cessation" doctrine has softened the property approach. Under that doctrine,
the cessation will not terminate the lease if it is called "temporary." The phrase "temporary cessation"
does not just refer to time. In determining whether a cessation is temporary, the courts consider
questions which relate to the fairness of depriving the lessee of the lease. See Amoco Production Co.
v. Braslau, 561 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. 1978).
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situation involved some fundamental difference between the two relation-
ships.' 79 To the extent that the authorities are interchangeable, they pres-
ent an argument that the relational approach of the oil and gas lease cases
should also apply to the relationship between the residual owner and the
severed mineral owner. A recent Oklahoma case appears to be inconsis-
tent with that line of thought, however. In Fransen v. Eckhardt,'8 0 the
Oklahoma court held that a term mineral interest expired because there
had been no production prior to the end of the primary term despite the
fact that a well had been completed prior to that time.'' The result
would have been different if the instrument had been an oil and gas lease,
because Oklahoma considers production to have begun at the moment a
well has been completed. The decisions in the lease cases were held to be
inapplicable to the term mineral deed situation because of a policy favor-
ing the early termination of such interests. The Fransen decision is not
only regressive, but also counterproductive in terms of the policy it seeks
to effect, and may be of questionable fairness.'8 2 On the other hand, it
does seem to bring a policy approach to the question of the duration of
mineral interests, the policy being that of eliminating the title problems
associated with dormant mineral interests.
While the Oklahoma case may contain mixed signals about the exten-
sion of the relational approach of the law of oil and gas leases to the min-
eral ownership cases, a recent case from Texas provides a clear indication
that the same approach should be applied in the two situations. In Amoco
Production Co. v. Braslau,as3 a drilled well located on a tract of land
ceased production."s The land was subject to a term mineral interest
which was beyond the primary term and therefore held only by produc-
tion.s When the lessee tried to complete it in a different formation, the
casing collapsed and the well was ruined.' 8 The lessee then moved over
to a new location, drilled to the target formation, and successfully com-
pleted a well.'8 7 Between the collapse of the casing in the old well and
the completion of the new well, some three months elapsed with no pro-
179. Wilson V. Holm, 188 P.2d 899 (Kan. 1948) (terminating a mineral deed when production
ended).
180. 711 P.2d 926 (Okla. 1985).
181. Fransen v. Eckhardt, 711 P.2d 926, 931 (Okla. 1985).
182. The decision has been criticized because it discourages the use of term mineral interests
and encourages parties to utilize perpetual fee interests when transferring mineral rights. Therefore,
it creates the exact problem whict te court was trying to avoid. It is also unfair because the oil and
gas lessee, who has control of development, is in a better position to protect his/her interest than the
mineral grantee, who has no control. See supra note 169.
183. 561 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. 1978).
184. Amoco Production Co. v. Braslau, 561 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex. 1978).
185. Id at 806.
186. Id. at 807.
187. Id.
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duction.'88 The Texas court preserved the interest of the term mineral
owner on the basis that the cessation of production was temporary.18 9 It
did so by relying upon authorities from the oil and gas lease cases.19 The
unusual aspect of the case is that the Texas court not only relied upon the
lease cases, but actually extended them into a new situation.191 The lease
cases relied upon were, themselves, a result of a softening of the harsh,
condition-oriented ownership approach; the interest of the lessee was
being preserved when the condition on which the secondary term
depended (i.e., continued production) had been violated. For the Texas
court to not only -apply these cases to the mineral ownership area, but to
also extend them into a new situation, indicates that the relational
approach is being extended to the mineral ownership cases.192
The content of the relationship created by an oil and gas lease is
largely based upon implied covenants,193 which are simply rules of fair-
ness that the courts have created to govern the relationship. The lease
does not deal in detail with the rights and duties of the parties, but is
largely significant as the document establishing the relationship. In fact,
oil and gas leases are fairly uniform in their content. Oil and gas scholars
have argued over whether the implied covenants, which actually govern
the relationship, are implied in fact or implied in law,1' 4 but there is not
really much question that they are court-created rules. Not only do these
implied covenants provide the bulk of the content of the lessor/lessee
relationship, but the courts sometimes impose them in the face of express
covenants to the contrary if the express covenants do not operate in a
manner that is fair to both parties."
188. Id.
189. Braslau, 561 S.W.2d at 809.
190. Id. at 808-09.
191. The "temporary cessation- cases had not yet been applied to a situation in which a new well
had to be drilled to maintain production. The doctrine's usual application was in situations in which
the lessee was reworking an existing well.
192. Ironically, the Texas courts had, prior to Braslau, been much more prone to apply the strict
condition-oriented approach with respect to both leases and deeds than the Oklahoma courts.
Compare Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Barnhill. 107 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. App. 1937) and Archer County v.
Webb., 338 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. 1960) with McVicker v. Horn, 322 P.2d 410 (Okla. 1958) and Beatty v.
Baxter, 258 P.2d 626 (Okla. 1953). See also Polston, Recent Developments, supra note 169, at 19-1
(commenting on these cases).
193. See generally MERRILL, supra note 170 (discussing implied covenants).
194. See A.W. Walker, Jr., The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease
In Texas, 11 TEx. L. REv. 399, 402-406 (1933) (arguing that implied covenants are implied in fact).
But see MERRILL, supra note 170, at 27 ("The obligations are imposed, not by agreement of the
parties, but by operation of law.").
195. For example, in cases involving a lease which requires the lessee to drill an offset well on
adjoining land located within a specified number of feet of the boundary, the courts have at times
extended the distance from the boundary which the lessee is obligated to protecL See Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Millette, 72 So.2d 176 (1954); Williams v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 432 F.2d
165 (5th Cir. 1970) (imposing duties on the lessee to prevent waste from under unleased land).
Similarly, in cases which contain a delay rental clause in the oil and gas lease expressly allowing the
lessee to delay drilling upon payment of a delay rental, some courts have held that the lessee must
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In resolving disputes in this area, the courts take a relational
approach rather than either a property or doctrinal contract approach.
The emphasis tends to be upon what is fair rather than on what the par-
ties own or what they intended. For example, while doctrinal contract law
might terminate or modify relationships on the basis of unconscionability,
fraud, mistake, etc., the oil and gas cases have no problem doing so simply
on the basis that an unfairness has occurred. 196 In fact, when resolving a
dispute, the courts are apt to give as much weight to fairness as to what is
contained in the document creating the relationship when the two are in
conflict.19 7  One court, in imposing a fiduciary duty in favor of a term
mineral owner and against the holder of the executive rights, stated that
the duty arises out of the relationship.' 98 The court said: "While a con-
tract or deed may create the relationship, the duty ... arises from the
relationship and not from express or implied terms of the contract or
deed." 99
The approach to the relationship between the severed mineral owner
and the residual owner has tended, on the other hand, to be ownership-
based. The mineral grantee owns the minerals in place in fee simple and
such ownership is of equal dignity with the residual estate.2co The min-
eral owner also owns an easement in the surface to obtain access to the
minerals.20' The easement in the surface gives an absolute right to enter
upon the surface in order to develop the minerals, with no obligation to
pay for the inconvenience caused the surface user.202 In adjusting the
drill to protect against drainage even though the payment has been made. See, e.g., Rogers v. Heston,
735 P.2d 542 (Okla. 1984).
196. For example, a West Virginia court held that an oil and gas lessor might be entitled to some
relief from the unfairness of a royalty clause which provided a flat $100 per year royalty on gas despite
a significant change in market demand for gas. See McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765 (W. Va.
1984). The lease had been executed before the turn of the century
, 
when such clauses were common,
and the royalty represented a fair return for lessor. Id. at 768. It had become unfair only because of
the change in market demand for gas. Id. at 769. It was suggested in a concurring opinion that the
lessor should be entitled to have the royalty rovision modiflea to reflect the current market value of
gas and that such a modification might take &e form of a one-eighth royalty. Ia See Polston, Recent
Developments, supra note 169, at 19.01. The concurring judge cussed the writings in the contracts
field in which doctrinal contract theory is breaking down in favor of a relational approach to that area.
McGinnis, 312 S.E.2d at 770. The same approach has been taken by the legislatures of West Virginia
and Pennsylvania, where the problem created by such conveyances is most acute. See Polston, Recent
Developments, supra note 169, § 19.01, at 19-2. In both states, it is provided by statute that permits
are not to be issued to do anything on such leases unless the lessee agrees to increase the royalty on
gas to one-eighth. See W. VA. CODE § 22-8-7 (1994); 52 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1396.36 (1993).
197. See supra note 195.
198. Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984).
199. id. at 183; see also Polston, Recent Developments, supra note 169, at 19-1, 19-26
(commenting on the case).
200. See text accompanying supra notes 28-29.
201. See David E. Pierce, Toward a More Functional Mineral Jurisprudence for Kansas, 27
WASHaunN L.J. 223, 240 (1988). See also Ronald W. Polston, Redefining the Relationship Between
the Surface Owner and the Mineral Developer, 12 E. MIN. L FouND. 22-1, 22-11 (1991)
[hereinafter Polston, Redefining the Relationship].
202. See Polston, Redefining the Relationship, supra note 201, at 22-12.
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relationship growing out of the development of the minerals, the mineral
interest is the dominant interest.203 Under such an approach, there is
little room for the courts to make adjustments to the relationship based
upon fairness and considerations of policy.
B. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
There are many examples of the excesses produced by the ownership
approach. One of the most well known may be a United States Supreme
Court opinion written by Justice Holmes. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,204 Holmes stated that the right to mine coal without leaving sup-
port for the surface, which right had been reserved from the surface own-
ers, was a property right of which the coal owner could not be
deprived.205 As a result, a statute which prohibited the withdrawal of sup-
port was held to be unconstitutional.20 6
Another Supreme Court case taking a less absolute approach to the
rights of the parties involved in such a relationship is Texaco v. Short, 07 in
which the Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, upheld the Indiana
Dormant Mineral Interests Act against objections based upon the owner-
ship approach which had prevailed in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.208
The Act provided that a mineral interest which is unused for a period of
twenty years will terminate in favor of the owner of the estate out of
which it was carved.2 9 While the statute was upheld on the basis that it
was similar to statutes of limitations and other title curative legislation,
and was, therefore, not inconsistent with a traditional ownership
approach, the attack on the statute was clearly based upon the notion that
the statute was fundamentally inconsistent with an ownership approach.
Those attacking the statute stated in their brief that "[t]he severance of
the minerals from the surface creates two estates of equal dignity, each a
freehold of inheritance .... ,210 The dissenting opinion began with that
same assumption.2 11 Furthermore, the opposition to this statute was very
203. Sun Oil v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Tex 1972) ("The oil and gas lessee's estate is the
dominant estate, and the lessee has an implied grant ... of free use of such part ... as is reasonably
necessary to effectuate the purposes of the lease[.)-).
204. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
205. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
206. Id. at 414 (determining that the Kohler Act of Pa., Pub. L. No. 1198 (1921) was
unconstitutional to the extent that it deprived mineral owners of their reserved rights). But see
Keystone Bituminous Coal Co. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (finding a similar statute
constitutional, resulting in a possible de facto overruling of Pennsylvania v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922)).
207. 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
208. Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 540 (1982).
209. See IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, art. 5, ch.11.
210. Brief for Appellant at 13, Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982) (No. 80-965).
211. Texaco, 454 U.S. at 540 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The State of Indiana has historically
afforded owners of incorporeal interests in minerals all the protections and privileges enjoyed by any
owner of an estate in land held in fee simple.").
574 [Vol. 70:541
MINERAL OWNERSHIP THEORY
intense and industry representatives clearly indicated their belief that
such statutes were inconsistent with the idea of ownership in place. 1  In
fact, prior to Texaco v. Short, several states held similar statutes to be
unconstitutional on the basis that they represented a taking of property
without due process of law.213
Emphasizing the extent to which the Indiana statute is inconsistent
with the ownership approach, are the statutes of IllinoiS214 and Ken-
tucky2 15 on the same subject. In those states, the mineral industries dom-
inated the drafting process and the statutes reflect a very clear ownership
approach. 16 Under those statutes, for example, the interests of absent
owners are not terminated automatically.217 Both statutes provide for a
trustee to be appointed and the proceeds held in trust for the owner.2 18
Both provide, however, for an adverse possession period to begin running
in favor of the surface owner after the appointment of a trustee. 19
In view of this background, the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Texaco v. Short must be read as more than a simple
reliance upon traditional property principles. It is, in fact, one of the
many decisions which have eroded the ownership approach to the rela-
tionship between the severed mineral owner and the owner of the
residual fee.
C. THE SURFACE DAMAGE CASES AND STATUTES
The area in which the interests of the residual owner and the mineral
developer most often come into conflict is with respect to the surface
rights of the mineral owner during development. Here, a strange phe-
nomenon has occurred in which the courts have insisted on taking a strict
ownership approach while the legislatures and parties involved in the
transactions have taken a relational approach. The courts have insisted
that the mineral owner or developer owns an easement in the surface
which carries with it the right to use so much of the surface as is reason-
212. See Polston, Marketability of Mineral 7itles, supra note 36, at 72 (referring to the
negotiations between this writer and representatives of the coal companies).
213. See Wilson v. Bishop, 412 N.E.2d 522 (Il. 1980); Contos v. Herbst, 278 N.W.2d 732
(Minn. 1979); Wheelock v. Heath, 272 N.W.2d 768 (Neb. 1978); Chicago & NA. Transportation Co.
v. Pederson. 259 N.W.2d 316 (Wis. 1977).
214. I.. ANN. STAT. ch. 765 para. 515/3 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
215. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 353.460 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993).
216, See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 765 para. 515/3 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 353.460
(Michie/Bobbs-Merril 1993).
217. See Iu. ANN. STAT. ch. 765 para. 515/3 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 353.460
(Michie/Bobbs-Merril 1993).
218, See ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 765 para. 515/3 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 353.460
(Michie/Bobbs-Menil 1993).
219. See ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 765 para. 515/3; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 353.460. See also Polston.
Recent Developments, supra note 169, at 19-1, 19-17 (commenting on the Illinois and Kentucky
statutes).
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ably necessary with no obligation to pay for any damages caused by the
development.2 0 Legislatures and parties involved in the transactions,
however, have acted as though the mineral developer was required to
compensate the residual owner for any damage or inconvenience result-
ing from development.2 1 The attitudes of the legislatures and the parties
are obviously more consistent with notions of fairness.
In Indiana, for example, the legislature adopted an Oil and Gas
Estates in Land Code2 in 1951, which provided that while the mineral
owner had a right to use the surface during development, there was an
obligation to pay for any damages caused thereby.' In the last section of
the Code, it was stated that the Code was intended to state the common
law as it existed in Indiana on the date of its enactment.224 Yet the com-
mon law of Indiana was the same as that of every state which had consid-
ered the question of surface rights of mineral developers.225 It was
directly opposite to that stated in the Code and was based upon the own-
ership approach in which the developer had no obligation to pay. A simi-
lar series of events transpired in Oklahoma, where the law, as declared by
the courts, was even more clear with regard to the right of the developer
to free use of so much of the surface as was reasonably necessary. In one
case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court counted the bales of hay that would
220. An exception to the general principle has been made with respect to the rights of the coal
owner to strip mine. See 6 AMERIcAN LAW OF MINING 200.02[l][b][ii] (1993) (basing the exception
on the right of the residual owner to subjacent support). In Kentucky, the resolution of this issue
involved not only the courts and legislature but the voters at the 1988 general election. The Kentucky
Supreme Court had held that while there was no right to strip mine generally, there was an exception
wi respect to coal transferred by a form of deed called a "broad form deed." See Buchanan v.
Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956). The legislature adopted a statute, however, which provided that
broad form deeds should be construed so as not to include the right to strip mine. Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 381.930-.945 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984). The Kentucky Supreme Court held the statute
unconstitutional on the ground that it invaded the court's constitutional judicial role. Akers v.
Baldwin, 736 SAV.2d 294 (Ky. 1987). The Legislature responded by putting the statute on the ballot
in the next general election as a pro posed constitutional amendment which was subsequently
adopted. See KENTucky CONsT. art. 19(2 There was some question as to whether the constitutional
amendment was consistent with the United States Constitution. That question became moot when
the Kentucky Supreme Court backed down and reversed the initial decision which had exempted the
broad form deed from the rule prohibiting strip mining. Ward v. Harding, 860 S.W.2d 280 (Ky.
1993).
221. For an empirical study of the attitudes of parties involved in developmental transactions
and a discussion of legislative assumptions, see Polston, Surface Rights, supra note 147, at 52. The
expectation of the surface user regarding payment for all damages occasioned by mineral
development is a long standing one. See Eugene 0. Kuntz, Discussion Notes, 10 OIL & GAs REP.
991, 996 (discussing Wilcox Oil Co. v Lawson, 341 P.2d 591 (Okla. 1959).
The frequent practice on the part of operators to pay location damages in order to
preserve amicable relations with the surace owner or lessor has led to a widespread
notion that a mineral owner or oil and gas lessee must compensate the surface owner for
any damage to the land resulting from oil and gas operations.
Id
222. IND. CODE ANN. ch. 32-5-7-1 (Bums 1990).
223. Id. § 32-5-7-2(c).
224. Id. § 32-5-7-5.
225. Pyramid Coal Corporation v. Pratt, 99 N.E.2d 427 (Ind. 1951).
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have been produced on the area which had been determined to be rea-
sonably necessary to the developmental project and refused to allow any
recovery for those, even though recovery was allowed for those produced
on the excess area used.226 In spite of that decision, the legislature
adopted a statute which required the mineral developer to negotiate in
good faith for the payment of all surface damages. 27 It contained not a
word creating liability for surface damages.' It assumed there was such
liability. Even while that statute was being adopted, however, the Court
of Appeals of Oklahoma was deciding a case consistent with the owner-
ship approach.22 9
In North Dakota, a Surface Damage Statute was adopted which
required the mineral developer to pay for all damage to the surface dur-
ing development.230 In upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit almost completely ignored the
ownership approach under which the mineral developers were being
deprived of an easement.231 The court reasoned that the standard of lia-
bility was simply being changed from negligence to strict liability and that
no one had a vested interest in such liability rules. 32
A peculiar aspect of all the surface damage statutes, including those
of Indiana, Oklahoma, North Dakota, and others, is that they apply not
only to those situations in which the developers' rights arise out of implied
easements but also to those in which such rights are a result of an express
easement.23 Apparently, the only situation in which payment of damages
226. Wilcox Oil Co. v. Lawson, 341 P.2d 591 (Okla. 1959).
227. OKLA. ST^T. ANN. tit. 52, § 318.5 (West 1994).
228. See Polston, Redefining the Relationship, supra note 201, at 22-6. In fact, the Oklahoma
Court of Appeals held in Bowles v. Kretchmar, 55 OKLA. B.J. 967 (1984), that the statute did not
create such an obligation. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held to the contrary, however, in Davis v.
Cloud, 766 P.2d 1347 (Okla. 1986). For a discussion of the judicial treatment of the act see Collins v.
Oxley, 897 F.2d 456 (10th Cir. 1990).
229. See Thompson v. Andover Oil Co., 691 P.2d 77 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984) discussed in
Discussion Notes 83 OIL AND GAS REP. 152, 153 (1985).
230. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1 (1993). The North Dakota statute has been copied in other
states. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-504 (1993)
231. Murphy v. Amoco Production Co., 729 F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1984).
232. The basis for the negligence analysis was that some of the surface damage cases had used a
negligence theory to measure the liability of the developer. Some of those cases involved personal
injuries to the landowner or to his cattle in the area where the developer was clearly entitled to be,
and were, therefore, similar to other landowner liability cases. See, e.g., Gage v. The Texas Co., 395
P.2d 411 (Okla. 1964). Some were traditional surface damage cases in wich the developer had
encroached on the surface user's rights by using or damaging the surface beyond what was reasonably
necessary for the project. See Sun Oil Co. v. Nunnery, 170 So. 2d 24 (Miss. 1964). If the ownership
approach was strictly adhered to, those cases should have been analyzed on the basis of whether the
developer had gone beyond the scope of the easement and thereby become a trespasser. In the latter
analysis it would not seem to matter whether the trespass was a result of negligence or not. There
would, in fact, be liability even if the trespass was not negligent. W. PAcE KEETON ETr AL, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE L \V OF TORTS 68 (5th ed. 1984). The fact that such cases were analyzed as
negligence cases is therefore inconsistent with the ownership approach to the relationship.
233. See Ronald W. Polston, Oil and Gas Developments, 10 E. MiN. L FOUND. 21-12 (1989)
(discussing the Uniform Surface Damage Act, including its provisions requiting the payment of
surface damages even by those mineral developers who have an express easement) [hereinafter
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will not be required is when they were clearly paid in advanceY-4 It thus
appears that rules of fairness created to govern the relationship are being
given priority over the express provisions of the document creating the
relationship, and that the ownership approach is being rejected by the
legislatures.
The surface damage cases in Texas provide an even more interesting
commentary on the status of the ownership approach to the severed min-
eral relationships. A series of cases in Texas between 1971 and 1984
attempted to bring together two problems which most courts had insisted,
based upon the ownership approach, were separate. Those problems
were (1) the deed construction problem involved in determining what was
to be included in the phrase "other minerals" contained in the granting
clause of a deed conveying a specific mineral, and (2) the surface rights of
mineral owners. Those problems are clearly related in that a determina-
tion that a particular substance is to be included in the mineral severance
will have an impact on the surface. Thus, a conveyance of oil and gas and
"other minerals" will have a significantly greater impact on the surface if
strip-mineable coal is considered to be an "other mineral," rather than a
nonmineral. The pre-1971 Texas cases held that a substance was not con-
sidered a mineral for purposes of the "other minerals" clause if its extrac-
tion could be surface destructive.23- The holding was refined in Reed v.
Wylie23' to include the rule that the time for determining whether the
removal of the substance could be surface destructive was the time the
question was required to be resolved in court rather than the time when
the conveyance was delivered.237 Thus, even though strip mining tech-
nology had not developed to the point where a particular vein of coal
could be removed through the surface at the time the deed was executed,
and the substance would, therefore, have been considered to be a mineral
at that time, it would not be so considered if the technology relating to
strip mining had advanced to the point where it could be removed
through the surface at the time of trial. The result is a doctrine in which
the right to extract and realize the economic benefit of some minerals will
Polston, Developments]; Polston, Redefining the Relationship, supra note 201, at 22-3 (citing
authorities that illustrate that the North Dakota act has the sam e effect); id. at 22-7 (attributing the
same effect to the Oklahoma act); Polston, Surface Rights, supra note 147, at 52 (showing the Indiana
act to have the same effect). These statutes all apply retroactively to existing relationships,
emphasizing the extent to which the legislative branch has taken a different approach than thejudiciary. Id
234. See Davis v. Cloud, 766 P.2d 1347, 1351 n.11(Okla. 1986) (suggesting that the exception in
the Oklahoma Surface Damage Act which preserves existing contract rights would not apply to
protect an existing easement but would only apply to "contracts in which damage provision standards
are specifically set forth in the contract-). See also Polston, Redefining the Relationship, supra note
201, at 22-7.
235. See, e.g., Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. 1971).
236. 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
237. Reed v. Wylie, 597 5.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980).
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not be known until the time for extraction arrives. Such a doctrine is, of
course, totally inconsistent with an ownership approach in which the own-
ership would have to be determined at the time of the conveyance. It is,
on the other hand, consistent with a relational approach in which the
respective rights of the residual owner and the owner of the mineral inter-
est are dependent upon rules of fairness and a recognition that what is fair
at any given time may not be fair at another time. 23s
The Texas cases were overruled in 1984 in Moser v. United States
Steel Corp.,239 but in a 'uling that was prospective only. ° They are pre-
sumably still the law with respect to some transactions. Even the overrul-
ing decision is an equally powerful rejection of the ownership approach,
however. In that decision, it was held that whether or not a substance is a
mineral is determined at the time of the conveyance and is to be based
upon normative attitudes at that time.24 ' Such a decision would appear to
be a regression to an ownership approach, but in dealing with the related
question of surface rights of mineral owners, the court remained on the
relational track. In that regard, it was held that the mineral owner was
entitled to remove the specific substance named in the severing convey-
ance pursuant to an implied easement and without obligation to pay dam-
ages. 2 With respect to any substances included in the conveyance
because of the phrase "other minerals," however, the mineral owner
would be required to pay full damages. Such a rule can be justified based
on considerations of fairness. The parties to the severance conveyance
should have anticipated the surface damage incident to removing the spe-
cifically mentioned mineral, but probably would not anticipate damage
with respect to those included as "other minerals." 4 The result is incon-
sistent with the ownership approach, not only because of the requirement
that some mineral owners pay for the right to use the surface, while
others differently situated do not, but also because of the distinction it
makes between two substances which are transferred in the same
document.
V. PROPOSING A NEW DIRECTION FOR MINERAL LAW
THEORY
As indicated above, the ownership approach has been giving ground
to a relational approach in regard to most aspects of the relationship
238. McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765 (W. Va. 1984) (holding that the content of a
relationship can vary with time). See supra notes 179-92 for discussion of the relational approach.
239. 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984).
240. Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984).
241. Id. at 102.
242. I. at 103.
243. Id. at 103 (providing an illustration of the rationale).
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between the mineral owner and the residual owner. That has been true
with respect to the surface rights of the mineral owner,2" the relationship
between the parties to an oil and gas lease,245 and the duration of mineral
interests.m Except for the cases dealing with the oil and gas lease, how-
ever, these advances have been a result of legislation.247 That legislation
has often simply recognized what is occurring in the industry itself.248
Examples of the latter phenomenon are the dormant minerals statutes,2 9
which mirror the industry practice reflected in the use of term mineral
deeds,250 and the surface damage statutes,25' which are based upon the
longstanding industry practice of paying for the use of the surface, an
industry practice which prevailed despite an insistence by the courts that
the industry could rely upon a more favorable ownership approach. z 2
The surface damage statutes were probably not even needed because
of a widespread industry practice of making full payment for the use of
the surface.25 Thus, the surface damage statutes may have had no effect
other than altering the bargaining power of the parties with respect to
payment of surface damages. With regard to the duration of mineral
interests, however, the courts continue to insist upon treating the severed
mineral interest as though it was a separate buried tract of land, applying
the same ownership concepts as are used with respect to the residual fee
estate. This is most apparent in cases dealing with the effect of nonuse of
the mineral estate. Those cases have produced a garbled doctrine of
adverse possession and prescription, leaving the ownership in place theory
largely intact.254 The only exceptions to the latter statement are the dor-
mant minerals legislation, the Louisiana doctrine of liberative prescrip-
tion,25 and a single case in California which held that such interests could
be lost by abandonment.256 The California case, however, applied the
principles of abandonment so restrictively that it cannot really be said to
make a substantial dent in the rigid approach of the courts.
There is a need for a modem approach to the question of the dura-
tion of mineral interests. Such an approach would recognize that when
the purpose for which the grant was made has ended, the interest termi-
244. See supra notes 220-239 and accompanying text.
245. See supra part IV.A.
246. See supra notes 153-167 and accompanying text.
247. See supra part III (discussing the legislative approach to mineral interests).
248. See supra note 153.
249. See supra part III (describing the genesis of dormant minerals statutes).
250. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (defining the meaning of term mineral deeds).
251. See supra part W.C. (discussing the development and effect of surface damage statutes).
252. See generally Polston, Surface Rights, supra note 147.
253. See Kuntz, supra note 221.
254. See supra notes 109-136 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
256. Cerhard v. Stephens, 442 P.2d 692 (Cal. 1968).
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nates. Thus, when a mineral interest is conveyed as a result of develop-
mental activity with respect to a particular mineral, the interest should
terminate when it is clear that such developmental activity has ended.
There is no unfairness to anyone in such a rule. Those who buy specula-
tive mineral interests at the time of a flurry of developmental activity are
buying into the potential production which is anticipated from that activ-
ity. To allow such interests to persist beyond that developmental activity
is to create title problems" 7 and to award windfalls to those who, years
later, acquire such interests. In the California case,z 8 which is one of the
few to have recognized that such interests can be abandoned, the frac-
tional mineral interests were created early in this century as a result of an
oil boom in the area. Fifty or more years later the existence of those
interests, now owned by persons who could not be located, were interfer-
ing with the development of the mineral estate pursuant to a new activity.
When the surface owner's lessee drilled an oil well, it sent speculators
scurrying to locate and buy the interests of the successors of the original
transferees. By not recognizing that such interests had terminated with
the oil boom that called them forth, the California court bestowed a wind-
fall upon those who succeeded in locating the long lost owners or their
successors, and, at the same time, placed an obstacle in the way of devel-
oping other land which might be subject to similar interests.
A result more consistent with good policy and, at the same time,
giving effect to the most reasonable expectations of the parties involved,
could be achieved by abandoning the emphasis upon ownership, which
pervades these cases, and taking a relational approach. Under such an
approach, a court would give content to the relationships created by min-
eral severance conveyances by developing rules based upon fairness and
good policy. Such rules would recognize that the interests should endure
only so long as the purpose for which they were created is being pursued.
Such an approach would be more consistent with current trends in
legal thought, but a modem approach to this question would be possible if
the courts simply rectified the historical error of classifying the mineral
interest as corporeal, and, at the same time, borrowed an approach from a
line of authority which deals with another kind of incorporeal interest.
The line of authority is embodied in the cases dealing with abandoned
railroad rights of way. When a railroad stops using a right of way in which
the railroad's interest was an easement, the interest of the railroad termi-
nates and the right of way reverts to the residual owner.2 9 The railroad
257. See Polston, Marketability of Mineral Titles, supra note 36, quoted with approval in
Energetics Limited v. Whitmill, 497 N.W.2d 497, 500 (Mich. 1993).
258. See 442 P.2d at 693.
259. See, e.g., Brown v. Weare, 152 S.V.2d 649 (Tex. 1941); Md. & Pa. R.R. Co. v. Mercantile
Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 166 A.2d 247 (Md. 1960).
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right of way cases thus take a slightly different approach to the abandon-
ment issue than do the cases dealing with other easements. With respect
to ordinary easements, the courts take the position that mere nonuse, no
matter how long continued, will not amount to abandonment. ° The rail-
road right of way cases, however, introduce the idea that cessation of the
pursuit of the purpose for which the interest was created can be consid-
ered to be an abandonment.26 In such cases, when the easement ceases
to be used, the interest will be considered to terminate in the absence of
an explanation for the nonuse.26 2
The analogy between the railroad cases and the mineral law cases is
quite complete, both in terms of the facts and policies involved. In both
situations, a commercial interest is given a right to use land for a specific
purpose; in the one case, to operate a rail line and in the other, to remove
the minerals. When the pursuit of that purpose is permanently aban-
doned, the interest of the railroad terminates and so it should in the case
of the mineral owner. Under such a system, the mineral interest would
terminate when its owner permanently abandons developmental activi-
ties. While such a system would require a factual determination that the
abandonment was permanent, that should not present an insurmountable
obstacle. That kind of determination is being made in cases involving the
abandonment of railroad rights of way.26 A similar determination is pres-
ently being made in the oil and gas cases in which a distinction is made
between a temporary cessation of production and a permanent one. 2e
That determination is made for the purpose of construing the habendum
clause of a lease or deed which requires continuous production. While
the approach being advocated here would not involve a requirement of
continuous production, it would require that the mineral owner continue
260. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
261. See Md. & Pa. R.R. Co. v. Mercantile Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 166 A.2d at 250 (appearing
to find that an interest ceased to exist in the absence of evidence that the cessation of use for the
purpose for which the interest was created was temporary).
[T]he right and title to a mere easement in land acquired by a quasi public corporation,
either by purchase, condemnation or prescription, for a public purpose is dependent
upon the continued use of the property for that purose, and when such public use is
abandoned the right to hold the land ceases, and the property reverts to its original
owner[]
Id. See also Cerhard v. Stephens, 442 P.2d at 720 (citing cases involving railroad rights of way, but
appearing to apply a more restrictive approach to the question of abanconment; an approach taken
from the cases dealing with ordinary easements).
262. Id.
263. See id (citing cases involving the abandonment of railroad rights of way). See also People
v. Ocean Shore R.R. Co., 196 P.2d 570, 578 (Cal. 1948) ("[T]he court could properly conclude that
the acts and conduct of defendant were incompatible with the continued exercise of the easement,
that the discontinuance of the line was not merely temporary, and that the right of way was
abandoned and the easement terminated.").
264. See HEMINWAY, supra note 136, § 6A(B).
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to actively manifest a desire and intention to make the interest
productive.
In fact, the same approach taken in the railroad right of way cases
was used in an oil and gas lease case. 26' The lease had a twenty-five year
primary term. After some initial activity, the lessee ceased work on the
land. Several years later, the lessor leased the same land to another. In
litigation between the two lessees, the court held that the first lease had
been abandoned. In doing so, it used language very similar to that used in
the railroad right of way cases. The court said:
The title and rights conveyed to Underwood or his assigns were
to be held.., for no other purpose than mineral exploration,
development, and production. When that purpose was no
longer prosecuted by Underwood and his assigns, their title and
estate instantly terminated .... Abandonment of the purpose for
which Underwood and his assigns were invested with their title
... [was] necessarily fatal. [They] permanently abandoned the
exploration and development of... minerals. Their estate at
once terminated. 66
While the oil and gas lase cases dealing with abandonment have not
generally been followed by the courts dealing with severed mineral inter-
ests,2 67 the reasoning of the Texas court in the Davis case,96 dealing with
the abandonment of a lease during the primary term, 9 is equally applica-
ble to the severed mineral situation. In fact, as has been pointed out,270
there is no reason why the oil and gas lease should be treated any differ-
ently than the severed mineral interest because both create the same kind
of interest in the transferee.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the first coal ownership cases were decided early last century,
mineral interests which have been severed from the residual estate have
been regarded as corporeal interests on a level with the residual interest
in the land. They are treated for most purposes as though they were bur-
ied tracts of land separated from the surface by an imaginary line drawn
just far enough below the surface to permit use of the surface for agricul-
265. Texas Co. v. Davis, 254 S.W. 304 (Tex. 1923).
266. I& at 308.
267. See supra notes 126-138 and accompanying text.
268. Davis, 254 S.W. 304 (1923).
269. The lease required the lessee to drill a well or pay delay rentals during the primary term
and provided that the drilling of a well would relieve the lessee of paying any further rentals duringthe 25-year rimary term. The lessee drilled a well whichproduce or a short time, but it had
thrduc orerrinl only asottmbti a
the effect offixing the lessee's rights for the remainder of the term.
270. See supra notes 126-138 and accompanying text.
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tural purposes or the erection of structures. This concept depends upon
the notion that the minerals are owned in place. It cannot be defended
on the basis of history, logic, policy, or notions of fundamental fairness,
and it has prevented the development of a sound body of law relating to
the relationship between the residual owner and the mineral owner.
Historically, it is flawed because such interests were characterized as
incorporeal interests by the common law. The early courts, apparently in
an effort to give the developing coal industry a more substantial interest in
the land where their deposits were located, ignored or incorrectly
described the common law precedents. Logically, the interest in the min-
erals cannot be anything more than a contingent title fragment which has
been temporarily split off from the residual fee interests. It can be noth-
ing more than that because it will exist only if there are minerals under
the land. If there are no minerals, or if they are all mined out, the interest
will cease to bestow any right of access to the land. Furthermore, the
ownership in place reasoning does not really address the question of the
nature of the interest in the land and yet, it is the entire basis for the
conclusions reached on that score. It represents bad policy because it
prevents the reunification of such interests with the residual fee after the
purpose of the conveyance has been accomplished as a result of cessation
of developmental activity with respect to the minerals involved. It is
inconsistent with fundamental notions of fairness because it skews the
results in the cases which deal with conflicts between the parties to the
relationship.
While the situation could be largely rectified by correcting the histor-
ical error and reclassifying the interest as incorporeal, a result more con-
sistent with current thinking would require that the emphasis upon
ownership be replaced by one in which the objective is to develop rules
based upon fairness and good policy to govern the relationship created by
the mineral conveyance. Many of the more recent cases can be explained
on the basis that such a process is already taking place. While most of
these cases deal with the relationships created by the oil and gas lease,
they would appear to be equally applicable to the relationships created by
the mineral severance. Indeed, the oil and gas lease is just as much a
transfer of all interest in the minerals as is a mineral severance deed.
There is no reason why the same relational approach that is used in the
lease cases should -not be utilized in the mineral severance cases.
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